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What is the relationship between public opinion and public policy? This question is
at the heart of representative democracy. This dissertation attempts to enhance our un-
derstanding of the role that partisanship plays in the opinion-policy process. We proceed
in four steps. First, section 1 situates the analyses that follow in the current literature.
section 2 uses data on spending preferences to estimate general spending preferences of indi-
viduals and congressional candidates in a shared dimension. The approach employed allows
for direct comparison between those two groups, and between the groups and where they
perceive policy to be. section 3 investigates whether partisans respond to policy changes
similarly. Findings indicate that partisans react differently to policy change in issue areas
with relatively large disagreement. Finally, section 4 flips the equation and considers policy
as the dependent variable. Are partisans more likely to get their preferred policies when
they control the White House? The answer, it seems, is yes. Policy responds primarily to
partisans of the same party as the president.
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1 Introduction
Political representation is a hallmark of democracy. Representation, though, has many dif-
ferent meanings. Representation can refer to the relationship between members of the public
and their elected representative(s). Geography provides the link between representatives and
their constituents.1 If you live in a representative’s geographic constituency, then you are
represented by them. This is sometimes referred to as formal representation.2
We can place higher demands on representation. One common demand is that the insti-
tution look like the people it claims to represent. Under this conception, it is normatively
desirable for political institutions to be about 50 percent female This kind of representation
is referred to as descriptive representation.
Yet another way of conceptualizing representation looks at outputs from the political
system. From this point of view, representation is best when outputs match the preferences
of those being represented. For example, if everyone wants policy X to be enacted, and it
is enacted, then substantive representation has been achieved. Here, much less emphasis
is placed on who is doing what than in formal representation or descriptive representation.
Instead, we just look at the outputs of the political system and compare them to the inputs
(in other words, the public’s preferences).
Modern democracies are expected to exhibit some kind of relationship between public
opinion and public policy. Hence, we want to understand the extent to which public opinion
affects policy and vice-versa. However, equally important is to to understand whose pref-
erences are getting represented in policy outputs. Democratic government promises that
citizens’ preferences are reflected in policy outputs, but we also want to understand if cer-
tain groups’ opinions matter more than others. Given this importance, links between public
opinion and public policy have not gone unstudied. Generally speaking, there is agreement
1Determining constituencies by geography is not the only way, but it is by far the most common today.
2Pitkin (1967) originally developed terminology used in this section for the various types of representation.
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among political scientists that public opinion can affect policy. The relationship is by no
means perfect, and can be absent in some policy areas.
Equally important is that citizens notice these policy changes and react to them. There
would be cause for concern if citizens made demands of government, government implemented
those demands, then citizens continued to demand more of the same. In other words, public
opinion needs to respond to public policy. After all, if the public requests more of a certain
policy and policymakers deliver more of it, the public should reduce their demand for more
of that policy, all else equal. If this relationship does not exist, then a worry is that the
public’s stated preferences for more or less of a policy are not actually tied to that policy.
In that case, we might worry if policy responded to public opinion, as it is responding to
something that is unanchored to the policy status quo.
Of course, we must also note that public opinion does not magically get translated into
policy outputs. There are important agents along the way who may or may not pay attention
and act on public opinion. These include people such as bureaucrats, judges, and party
leaders. However, among the most visible of policymakers are legislators and other elected
officials. Given that they are directly selected by the people, we might expect a fairly strong
link between the public’s views (or at least their constituent’s views) and the views of elected
officials.
This dissertation expands our knowledge of public opinion, partisanship, and public policy
by linking together what we already know in order to generate and test new hypotheses. It
is composed of four parts. In the current section, I review what we already know about
public opinion, partisanship, and public policy in order to create new theory and testable
hypotheses.
The following three sections are each designed to be self-contained. In section 2, coau-
thored with Stephen Jessee, we develop a model of individual’s spending preferences.3 Dis-
agreement over the size of government is one of the deepest disagreements, so it is essential
3A modified version of section 2 is published by Electoral Studies.
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to understand people’s spending preferences and how they are (or are not) represented. Us-
ing data on relative preferences for more or less spending across different issue areas, we
estimate the general spending preferences of individuals and congressional candidates along
a left-right spending dimension. Our modeling approach also allows us to estimate the loca-
tion of policies on this same dimension, permitting direct comparison of people’s spending
preferences with where they perceive policy to be. Echoing other work in this area, we
find that public shows very low levels of polarization on spending preferences, even across
characteristics like partisanship, ideology, or income level. The distribution of candidates’
spending preferences shows much more sorting by party.
Next, section 3, explores how partisanship influences the effect of policy on public opin-
ion.4 Do partisans respond differently to changes in public policy depending on which party
controls the government? It is well established that opinions of various groups tend to move
in parallel over time; however, work on partisanship shows that partisans can respond very
differently to the same message. In section 3, I investigate whether partisans from different
parties react the same to changes in policy, the implication of the parallel publics literature,
or differently, as literature on partisanship would imply. I argue that we should see impor-
tant differences in policy feedback between partisan groups, but only on salient policies that
have large disagreement across partisan lines. In other words, in those areas that people are
most passionate about and disagree with one another. To test this, I use the thermostatic
model of opinion-policy feedback, relying on data from the 1973–2014 General Social Survey.
Results indicate that partisans react differently to policy in issue areas with relatively large
disagreement; the main findings are captured in Figure 13. This enhances our understanding
of the interaction of partisan control of government and partisanship in the opinion-policy
process. I conclude by discussing some of the implications of these findings for research on
public opinion and public policy.
4A modified version of section 3 is published at Public Opinion Quarterly.
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Finally, in section 4, I reverse the focus and shifts towards analyzing public policy as the
dependent variable. In particular, I look at whether partisans are more likely to get their
preferred policy outputs when their own party controls government. In other words, is policy
more responsive to opinion of in partisans than out partisans? Partisans fight fiercely to get
their own party’s politicians into office; presumably, at least one of their goals is to get their
preferred policy enacted. This assumption — that partisan’s policy preferences matter more
when their party is in power — underlies much of our understanding of politics, yet is not
well-tested. Furthermore, there are reasons to believe it is simply not true. The American
political system was designed to move slowly and force compromise across political camps.
Using data across 11 issue areas from 1973 to 2016, I test whether partisans’ opinions matter
more when their party is in power. I show that control of government can matter, but it
oftentimes does not. However, for highly salient, big spending issues, policy responds more
to partisans of the same party as the president. The same is not true about Congress.
1.1 Public Opinion & Public Policy
What is the nature of public opinion, and how does it affect public policy? Early scholars
were pessimistic about most people’s ability to hold stable, coherent political preferences
(see Converse 1964, for the canonical example). One of the most consistent findings in
political science is that individuals in general are remarkably uninformed about current
events, policies, and political leaders (Carpini and Keeter 1997; Galston 2001). This lead
to worry and hand wringing that public opinion is ephemeral and easily manipulated by
political and economic elites to nefarious purposes.
However, another consistent finding is that if we aggregate individual’s preferences up-
ward to larger groups, then we find remarkable stability of public opinion over time (Page
and Shapiro 1992). This suggests that even if members of the public are not paying attention
individually, as a group their attitudes remain stable. This is likely because most of the time
people are not receiving messages about a particular attitude they hold, so their attitudes
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vary randomly a bit. This random variation at the individual level is canceled out when
we aggregate up. Even when they are receiving messages, if people already hold a strong
attitude on that subject, they will be unlikely to change their mind. Taken together, these
suggest that the only areas where aggregate public opinion will exhibit instability is in areas
where people do not already hold strong attitudes and are receiving information (Druckman
and Leeper 2012). Since receiving information about a topic is likely to lead to attitude
formation, this is unlikely to happen often. Thus, it is perhaps not entirely surprising that
public opinion at the aggregate level is coherent and stable in ways that are difficult to find
when looking at the individual level.
Not only do we find stability at the group level that did not exist at the individual level,
we also find that public opinion reacts to policy change predictably. Generally speaking,
as the amount of a certain policy increases (for example, if we spend more on a policy),
then people’s desire for additional increases goes down. The logic behind this is referred to
as the “thermostatic model” of public opinion (Wlezien 1995). Research has expanded the
initial analysis of the thermostatic model across the US states (Pacheco 2013b) and across
other Western democracies (Soroka and Wlezien 2010), as well as aggregating across multiple
issues (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).
In general, the thermostatic model holds up very well across different contexts. There
are some factors, however, that can modify the strength of the relationship. One of the most
important is issue salience (Soroka and Wlezien 2010). The public does not tend to know
much or care much about nonsalient issues, almost by definition. We also suspect that it is
harder for elected representatives to know their constituency’s opinion on nonsalient issues,
since many of the traditional ways of garnering that information do not exist for nonsalient
issues. For example, pollsters do not ask very much about these topics. Additionally, people
are not likely to contact their representatives about issues about which they care little.
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1.1.1 Representation by Policymakers
There is a large body of literature focusing on whether policymakers — usually elected
officials — represent public opinion. Previous research has looked at this in a few different
ways. One way checks whether individual officials’s views align with the views of their
constituents. This is referred to as “dyadic” representation. The other popular way of
assessing representation, referred to as “collective” representation, is to look at whether the
public as a whole is represented by the legislative body as a whole (Weissberg 1978).
Of course, there are also concerns here about certain groups getting better or worse
representation. Some research suggests that constituents are less well represented when they
are of a different race than their elected official (Broockman 2013).
Salience can affect this relationship, of course. We do not expect people to have very
strong opinions on nonsalient issues. Since we suspecct the mechanisms the opinion-policy
link relies on are absent for nonsalient issues, these issues may not be tightly tethered to
public opinion. For example, if an issue is not salient, then pollsters may not ask about
it, and constituents may not contact their Congressperson to inform them of their opinion.
If the Congressperson has no way of knowing what their constituents want, then we would
expect the link from opinion to policy to weaken or break.
1.1.2 Whose Opinion Matters?
Another concern in a democracy where public policy responds to public opinion is whose
opinion policy is responding to. Different groups want different policies, and it is possible
that one large, well organized group can exert its preferences to the detriment of other less
organized groups.
Although the national founders spent a lot of time worrying about “tyranny of the major-
ity,” people today typically spend more time worrying about smaller interests getting their
preferred policies over the objections of larger interests. We know that it can be difficult for
large, diffuse interests to organize themselves (Olson 1965). For example, a contemporary
6
debate is over “net neutrality.” In this debate, proponents typically argue that large telecom
companies are getting their preferred policy over the objections of most Americans.
One such group of particular concern is the rich. If the richest citizens can subvert the
political system for their own economic benefit because they have more time and resources,
that is a real problem, normatively speaking. Over the past decade or so, scholars have
devoted significant resources to determining whether this is the case. Two main findings
emerge from this research area. First, preferences of Americans are not very different across
income groups (Bartels 2005; Gilens 2012; Soroka and Wlezien 2008). This limits the prac-
tical importance of the question. Second, there is only limited evidence that the rich get
their way over the preferences of average-income Americans, though there is more evidence
that the poorest Americans have less influence over the political process than they should if
everyone were represented equally.
1.2 Partisanship
Partisanship has not been neglected in the political science literature. Partisanship is the best
predictor of many political phenomena such as an individual’s opinion on a topic, how they
will vote in the upcoming election, and our perception of our own representatives. Some of
the earliest accounts of how Americans perceived the political world noted that partisanship
played an important role in coloring people’s perceptions (Angus Campbell et al. 1960).
In the United States, like many countries, partisanship and ideology are closely inter-
twined. While theoretically distinct, they are so closely related that it can be empirically
difficult to distinguish between them. This has become more true in recent years, a phe-
nomenon referred to variously as “polarization” or “sorting.” Generally, using the term
“polarization” refers to the average Republican becoming more conservative and the aver-
age Democrat becoming more liberal. “Sorting,” on the other hand, refers to conservatives
leaving the Democratic party for the Republican party and vice-versa.
7
Though there is wide agreement that, at the elite level, the parties have polarized over
time (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Theriault 2006; Theriault 2013), we lack such
consensus for the public. The literature itself is polarized over whether the public has
polarized over time or not. One side (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2008; Fiorina and Abrams
2008) argues that there is not enough evidence to conclude that the public has polarized over
time. The other (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Webster and Abramowitz 2017) argues
that the public has indeed polarized over time.
Regardless of whether members of the public have become more polarized over time
or not, partisanship has been and remains the single best predictor of a whole plethora
of political attitudes and behavior. Thus, we might suspect that partisanship affects the
relationship between public opinion and public policy.
1.3 Public Opinion, Partisanship, and Public Policy
Despite the prominence of partisanship in the literature on formation of public opinion,
there has been little research on how partisanship impacts the public opinion — public
policy loop. There are good reasons to suspect that it does; partisanship is after all how
politics is organized in the United States.
Soroka and Wlezien (2010) do look at whether Democrats, Independents, and Republi-
cans respond differently to changes in public policy. They find that the three groups respond
very similarly.
In the following three sections, I argue that we should expect to see partisanship play a
role in the public opinion — policy process. The arguments in the next two, section 3 and
section 4, are similar. There I argue that we should not expect to see differences necessarily
because one person is a Democrat and the other a Republican, but because one of them has
control of government. Republicans should be less responsive to policy change and more
likely to get the kinds of policies they want, but only when a fellow Republican controls
government. The same is true for Democrats. The final section, section 2, takes a slightly
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different approach. Here, we examine political representation by estimating individuals’ and
congressional candidates’ spending preferences. We perform the estimation in such a way
that it allows us to compare across groups. We find that in the public, Democrats and
Republicans are very similar. The same is not true at the elite level, however, where the
parties are more polarized.
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2 Modeling Spending Preferences & Public Policy
Deciding how much to spend and on what is one of the most consequential tasks of a modern
day government.5 The United States government, despite spending a relatively small percent
of the country’s GDP in comparison to many advanced industrialized democracies, still
spends an amount roughly equal to one fifth of the nation’s economic output. At the same
time, the size of government, which is closely linked to spending, is commonly seen as one of
the most prominent issue dimensions dividing the two major political parties in modern U.S.
politics, playing a significant role in electoral politics. This makes understanding preferences
for spending, particularly in relation to spending levels on specific issues, a particularly
important task for scholars.
However, the usual instrument for measuring public opinion — the survey question — has
some difficulties measuring spending preferences, which limits the study of spending prefer-
ence and policy in the electoral arena. While it is easy to imagine that survey respondents
can provide meaningful answers to questions on non-spending issues, such as “Do you believe
that same-sex marriage should be legal?” or “Under what circumstances do you think that
abortion should be allowed?,” spending policy is denominated on a scale that is virtually
unfathomable to all but the most informed policy wonks.6 Therefore, surveyors usually ask
a less demanding question about respondents’ relative preferences — whether they would
like to see spending increased, decreased, or kept about the same.7 A notable application of
5This chapter is coauthored with Stephen Jessee. The authors contributed equally. This chapter has been
published by Electoral Studies (Branham and Jessee 2017) and is reproduced here with their permission.
6Previous work has highlighted the difficulty that citizens have in estimating quantities such as the infla-
tion or unemployment rates (Conover, Feldman, and Knight 1986) or overall economic conditions (Holbrook
1996). Gilens (2001) shows that perceptions about the percent of the federal budget devoted to foreign
aid are often very far from the true values. Spending levels would seem to be an order of magnitude more
difficult to comprehend. Even knowing whether spending on most areas is measured in millions, billions, or
trillions is likely beyond the capacity of many Americans. Ansolabehere, Meredith, and Snowberg (2012)
show that survey respondents can understand familiar economic quantities, particularly when provided with
benchmarks. This work, however, focuses on numbers that respondents are likely to come into direct contact
with in the course of their daily lives such as the price of gasoline. Our focus on federal spending levels
seems quite different from these quantities.
7There are, of course, other ways of measuring preferences related to spending. One such way is to
ask about the general level of spending or taxation rather than spending on a given policy (for examples,
Hansen 1998; Krimmel and Rader 2017). Using relative preferences gives us the advantage of being able
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this logic is the thermostatic model of public opinion and policy (Wlezien 1995; Soroka and
Wlezien 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2012; Pacheco 2013b). In this model, citizens’ relative
preferences represent the difference between the citizen’s preferred, or ideal, policy position
and the actual location of policy on a given issue. Other scholars have focused on determin-
ing how spending preferences on specific issues influences voters’ electoral choice (Williams
2015) or how personal experience with welfare benefits can affect vote choice (Orriols 2010).
While relative preferences are interesting, they are limited in what they can tell us by
themselves. We cannot, for example, measure distance — that is, when two people both say
that they prefer greater spending, we cannot say whether one of them prefers much more and
the other just a little more, or whether they both want a great deal more. Similarly, when
a respondent answers that spending is “about right,” we have no way of knowing whether
spending is exactly right for them or whether they would prefer a little more or a little less.
This is important if we want to compare how well represented different groups of the public,
if we seek to understand the role of spending preferences in electoral decisions, or if we are
interested in studying polarization. Relative preferences also do not give us information
on respondent’s overall spending preferences. While ideology represents a simplification of
politics into a left-right space, we lack a comparable measure for spending preferences.8
In the next section, we develop a model that uses respondents’ stated relative spend-
ing preferences to estimate an overall spending preference for each respondent. Previous
research has already shown that it is reasonable to scale some issues together to measure
underlying spending preferences (Jacoby 1994; Schneider and Jacoby 2005; Jacoby 2008).
Our model also estimates the position of spending policy on each specific issue on the same
scale as respondent preferences. Following this, we use data from the 2014 General Social
to use multiple questions to jointly scale preferences of the public and congressional candidates together
(see Ansolabehere, Rodden, and James Snyder 2008, for a discussion of why using multiple measures of
preferences is especially useful).
8Of course, the work on the public’s “mood” is related to this (Stimson 1991; Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson 2002; Enns and Kellstedt 2008). Stimson, however, includes nonspending information in his measure.
There are also other attempts at creating a spending-specific mood measure (Ura and Ellis 2012), which we
discuss more below.
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Survey (GSS) to estimate the model and discuss the parameter estimates.9 In addition to
constructing a measure for spending preferences and policy location, we also contribute to
two debates in the literature.
First, our estimates of citizens’ ideal points and policy positions suggest that spending
on most policies is lower than many individuals’ preferences. There may be systematically
lower spending levels than a majority prefers, though limitations of the data make this
difficult to say with certainty. These results are in line with scholars who suggest that the
government budget is too small (Downs 1960). Since increased spending is usually associated
with liberalism, our results are also in line with studies that find that policy is oftentimes to
the right of what people want (Lax and Phillips 2012, though they focus at the state level).
Second, we also show that there is little polarization in the public, at least with regard
to spending preferences. Although the public may be polarized on other issues, it does
not appear to be polarized by spending preferences.10 Additionally, there is virtually no
difference in spending preferences across income levels, and only a little across party lines
or self-reported ideology. This suggests that, with regard to spending preferences at least,
there is little polarization in the public.
From there, we apply our framework to estimate spending preferences of citizens and
candidates in congressional elections on the same scale. This is possible because the 1998
GSS and the 1998 National Political Awareness Test, a survey fielded to candidates running
for election to the U.S. Congress, used identical or nearly identical questions about spending
preferences. These results allow for the direct comparison of spending preferences of the
mass public and political elites
9We also analyze a question wording experiment embedded in the GSS for a majority of the spending
issues, showing that most estimates are unaffected by changes in wording.
10The literature on polarization is vast and somewhat polarized itself. Abramowitz and Saunders (2008),
Baldassarri and Gelman (2008), and Webster and Abramowitz (2017), for example, argue that the public
is more polarized. Fiorina and Abrams (2008) and Levendusky (2009) argue otherwise. Others argue that
polarization is more complicated. Perhaps it has occurred in some issue areas, like climate change (McCright
and Dunlap 2011), or only among partisans (Lelkes 2016).
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We show that while there is very little partisan polarization among the spending pref-
erences of ordinary citizens, congressional candidates show relatively strong divergence by
party in terms of their preferred level of government spending (this is in line with other lit-
erature on the subject; see for example Theriault 2006; Theriault 2013). Again, comparing
spending levels with spending preferences we find that spending on most policies is lower
than median preferences.
2.1 An Item Response Model of Spending Preferences
Because measuring absolute spending preferences directly through survey questions is in-
feasible, we propose a model that uses data on relative preferences across specific spending
areas to estimate absolute preferences for overall spending. Our approach is related to that
of Richman (2011), who combines DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal 2011) with
legislators’ expressed relative preferences in order to estimate the positions of status quo
locations. Instead of using exogenous preference estimates, however, we estimate both the
preferences of individuals (and later, candidates) and the locations of spending policy in
specific areas on a common overall spending dimension.
We build on the ideal point framework commonly used to measure ideology and other
latent attitudes in political science (see, for example, Poole and Rosenthal 1991; Heckman
and James Snyder 1996; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004). Let xi represent individual
i’s ideal point along a spending dimension.11 Since we are dealing with spending issues, xi
represents a respondent’s overall preference for government spending.
Under our model, person i’s preferred spending level in policy area j is given as:
y∗ij = xiβj + εij (1)
11Others have argued that individuals’ spending preferences (xi in our model) are related and unidimen-
sional (for example Jacoby 1994; Jacoby 2008). If preferences in a certain policy are either only weakly related
or unrelated to this single dimension, as some previous research finds, then the associated discrimination
parameter β will be at or near zero.
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where xi is individual i’s overall spending preference, βj is an issue-specific discrimination
parameter, and εij ∼ N(0, 1) is a disturbance term assumed to be independent across re-
spondents i and issues j.
We do not directly observe y∗ij, but instead observe the response yij, referred to in the
literature as a “relative preference,” a trichotomous outcome of either “too much,” “about
right,” or “too little,” assumed to be generated according to:
yij =

“too much” if y∗ij < κ1j
“about right” if κ1j ≤ y∗ij < κ2j
“too little” if κ2j ≤ y∗ij
(2)
where κ1j and κ2j are question-specific cutpoints between the three response options.
Under this model, people are more likely to say there is too little spending on a specific
issue when their spending preference xi is higher. Equivalently, they are more likely to say
that there is too much spending on a specific issue when their spending preference xi is lower.
The cutpoints κ1j and κ2j indicate the thresholds between the three response types (“too
much,” “about right,” and “too little”), which can vary across policy areas. These cutpoints
can be thought of similarly to those in an ordered probit model.
Of central interest here are the locations of spending policy, at least as understood by
citizens, on each issue area. It should be noted that we are not attempting to estimate ac-
tual dollar amounts of spending, which would be readily available from government reports.
Instead, we seek to estimate a spending preference dimension structured based on the pref-
erences of people. Whether one prefers more or less spending on a given issue is determined
by one’s overall spending preference as well as the characteristics of the specific spending
area in question (Soroka and Wlezien 2010). In this framework, for example, there would
be nothing wrong with the spending policy position for defense being estimated to be to the
left of that for space exploration despite the fact that the country spends many times more
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on defense than space exploration in dollar terms. What we seek to estimate is one’s overall
preferences for spending, rather than the specific dollar amount one wishes the government
would spend either overall or in any one area.
Although there is not a specific parameter in the model representing the spending loca-
tions for each policy area, by explicitly laying out an assumed structure for the relationship
between spending preferences and responses, we can produce direct estimates of these policy
positions. Specifically, it is possible through a simple transformation of parameters to obtain
estimates of these quantities. For issue j, we calculate the location of spending policy (pj)
as
pj ≡ κ1j + κ2j
2βj
(3)
which is simply the average of the two cutpoints on issue j divided by the issue’s discrimi-
nation parameter.
This location is a sensible estimate of each policy’s locations for a few reasons. First,
it represents the spending preference value at which a respondent would be equally likely
to say “too much” or “too little” is spent on issue j. Second, it is also the value at which
the probability of saying that spending on issue j is “about right” is maximized.12 Finally,
respondents with overall spending preferences to the left (right) of pj are more (less) likely
to say that there is “too much” than “too little” spending on the policy in question.
The estimated policy positions are not meant to measure the dollar amount of spending
on each issue. To the contrary, they represent perceived spending positions according to
respondents on a relative, not absolute, scale. Specifically, the spending policy locations
indicate the position of each policy’s spending level relative to the spending preferences of
individuals. Policies on which only the respondents with the highest spending preferences
want more spent will be estimated to have higher spending levels, while those on which most
respondents want more spent (in other words, only those with the lowest spending preferences
12Though note that this does not mean that “about right” will necessarily be the most likely answer on
policy j for a respondent whose spending preference is located at pj .
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prefer that less be spent) will have lower estimated spending locations. Estimating these
spending positions reveals the locations of policy in each area relative to the distribution of
individuals’ overall spending preferences.
2.2 Estimating Citizen’s Spending Preferences
As described above, our model uses expressions of relative spending preferences — whether
citizens prefer that spending in a given area be increased, decreased, or kept about the same
— to estimate the absolute positions of both citizen spending preferences and policies on
an overall spending preferences dimension. Therefore, to estimate this model we require
survey data in which respondents are asked whether they want more, less, or about the same
amount of spending on each of a variety of different spending areas.
The GSS provides just such a dataset. In this section, we analyze the 2014 GSS, which
was fielded to 2,538 respondents between February and April of 2014. The 2014 GSS targeted
English or Spanish speaking people 18 years or older, living in non-institutional arrangements
within the United States. These data are particularly well suited for our purposes because
they include 18 spending questions across a diverse set of spending areas. Table 1 lists the
wordings for these questions as well as the percent of respondent giving each of the three
response options — “too much,” “about right,” and “too little.”13
Of course, a limitation of these data is that the questions do not explicitly ask respondents
to make tradeoffs, though the question text does mention expense. Presumably, individuals’
(and later, candidates’) responses would change if we forced them to choose between increased
spending and higher taxes (or more deficit spending, etc). If there is a lot of arbitrariness to
individuals’ answers (i.e. if everyone generally wants more “free” spending on all policies),
we might worry about how much information we actually have in the data to estimate an
underlying spending preference. After all, if we force individuals to make tradeoffs (including
13The question text is “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved
easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me
whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.”
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Table 1: 2014 GSS Spending Items.
Response percent
Policy GSS Variable Wording too much about right too little
Education nateduc improving the nation’s education system 6.0 22.2 71.7
Environment natenvir improving and protecting the environment 9.6 31.7 58.8
Race natrace improving the conditions of Blacks 15.4 48.7 35.9
Health natheal improving and protecting the nation’s health 13.4 27.6 59.0
Big cities natcity solving the problems of big cities 16.2 36.5 47.3
Child care natchld assistance for childcare 9.0 39.8 51.2
Welfare natfare welfare 49.2 30.4 20.4
Energy natenrgy developing alternative energy sources 10.5 32.1 57.4
Drugs natdrug dealing with drug addiction 11.9 28.7 59.4
Mass transportation natmass mass transportation 9.3 51.0 39.7
Parks natpark parks and recreation 6.4 61.9 31.7
Science natsci supporting scientific research 12.2 46.2 41.6
Crime natcrime halting the rising crime rate 8.6 30.1 61.3
Foreign Aid nataid foreign aid 64.1 28.5 7.4
Social Security natsoc social security 6.3 37.6 56.1
Roads natroad highways and bridges 12.1 41.1 46.8
Space natspac space exploration program 29.0 45.0 25.9
Defense natarms the military, armaments, and defense 31.1 32.4 36.4
in the survey question that increasing spending leads to increased taxes, for example) and
everyone then answers that spending levels are about right or too high we may worry how
much we can learn from questions without tradeoffs.
Previous research at least somewhat assuages this fear for three reasons. People do
not seem to want something for nothing, generally speaking (S. Welch 1985). Second, the
thermostatic model seems to work. That is, when spending goes up, fewer people want
additional spending. This leads us to conclude that people are not viewing spending increases
in these questions as “free.” Third, people’s responses to these spending questions tend to
reflect a guns/butter tradeoff (Wlezien 1995). In other words, when support for defense
spending increases (decreases), support for social spending tends to decrease (increase). This
indicates that individuals are taking into account the fact that money is limited, at least
in some sense. This is in line with what scholars have found more recently when they force
individuals to decrease spending in one area if they increase spending in another (Bonica
2015).
We estimate our model in a Bayesian framework using JAGS (Plummer 2003), called
through the rjags package in R (Plummer 2015), to implement a Gibbs sampler that produces
draws from the joint posterior distribution over all of the model’s unknown parameters
given the data.14 Independent vague normal priors (mean zero, variance 100) are used for
discrimination parameters (βj) and cutpoints (κ1j and κ2j), while independent standard
normal priors are used for spending preferences xi. The model is run in an unidentified state
and each iteration of the sampler is post-processed to impose the identifying restriction that
respondent spending preferences have mean zero and variance one, and that higher values of
spending preferences represent preferences for more spending in general (although this will
not necessarily be true for all individual policies, a point discussed in more depth below).15
14The sampler was run for 250,000 iterations, discarding the first 100,000 as burn in and saving every 25th
after that for a total of 6,000 stored samples. Following Gill (2008), multiple diagnostics were calculated.
All indicate that the sampler reached convergence fairly quickly and that the effective sample sizes for all
parameters were large enough for reliable inference. See subsubsection A.1.2 for details.
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Figure 1: Discrimination Parameter Estimates, 2014 GSS. Dots represent posterior means,
horizontal bars indicate 95% HPDs.
The estimated discrimination parameters (βj) for the 2014 GSS are shown in Figure 1.
These parameters indicate how strongly and in what direction respondents’ overall spending
preferences (xi) are related to responses on each question. Seventeen out of the eighteen βj
estimates are positive, with only one (space) having its 95% highest posterior density region
(HPD) overlap zero. This indicates that on almost all spending areas, respondents with
higher overall spending preferences are more likely to prefer more (and less likely to prefer
less) spending on specific issues.
Some of these positive discrimination parameters, such as those for education, environ-
ment and race, are larger in magnitude, indicating that individuals’ overall spending prefer-
ences are strongly related to spending preferences on that issue.16 Others, such as those on
16Of course, their specific response will also depend on the values of the cutpoints κ1j and κ2j , which are
presented in Figure 2 below.
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roads, social security and foreign aid, are estimated to be smaller in magnitude, suggesting
that they are not as central to overall spending preferences.
There are two values among the estimated discrimination parameters that merit further
explanation. First, space shows little evidence of discrimination along the overall spending
dimension. This means that relative preferences over spending on space exploration are
largely unrelated to overall spending preferences. Second, defense spending has a discrim-
ination parameter that is estimated to be slightly negative. This implies that those who
have higher overall spending preferences are more likely to prefer less spending on defense.
Equivalently, individuals who prefer less spending generally are more likely to prefer more
spending on defense. While this may seem somewhat counterintuitive at first glance, defense
is one of the few issues in modern American politics on which conservatives, who tradition-
ally prefer lower levels of overall government spending, often argue for more spending than
liberals.
The cutpoint parameters for each question (κ1j and κ2j) indicate the regions of the scale
for y∗i in which respondents are likely to give each of the three response options for each
question. These parameters, whose estimates are shown in Figure 2, can be interpreted
similarly to the cutpoints in an ordered probit model.17
As discussed above, the model is identified by restricting xi to have mean zero and
variance one across all respondents at each iteration of the sampler. Thus we can interpret
zero on the spending scale as “moderate,” at least relative to the distribution of preferences
in the public. The majority of respondents have estimated preferences between −1 and
1, with virtually all the estimates falling between −2 and 2. Overall, the distribution of
spending preference estimates is unimodal, and very close to a standard normal.18
Figure 3 plots the estimated location of each of the policies on the same overall spending
preferences dimension on which respondent spending preferences (xi) are estimated. Poste-
17In fact, conditioning on spending preferences xi reduces the model to a set of ordered probit models,
one for each spending preference question.





















Figure 2: Cutpoint Estimates, 2014 GSS. Dots represent posterior means for κ1 and κ2,
horizontal bars represent 95% HPDs. κ2 is in the lighter shade.
rior medians are represented by dots and 95% HPDs are represented by lines.19 The numbers
under the policies represent the 95% HPD of the proportion of people whose ideal spending
point is to the right of that policy’s location.
These estimates represent where each policy falls on the primary dimension structuring
citizens’ overall preferences for government spending. The highest estimated policy location
is for foreign aid with a posterior median of 2.84, indicating that this policy is located to the
right of virtually all respondents’ overall preferences. Note that this does not mean that we
would predict that virtually all respondents would say that the government is spending “too
much” on foreign aid, but rather that the probability of saying there is “too little” spent on
foreign aid is low for all respondents. The three spending areas other than foreign aid that
19Posterior medians, rather than means, are used for pj because the division by βj in Equation 3 means
that for iterations where the discrimination parameter is near zero, the value of pj becomes extremely large
in magnitude, resulting in very unstable estimates. This is only consequential for policies such as space
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Figure 3: Policy Position Estimates, 2014 GSS. Dots represent posterior medians for policy’s
location as defined in Equation (3). The HPD for space’s location is not fully contained
in the figure—it ranges from around −6 to 8, but is not reliably estimated given that the
discrimination parameter for this item is often sampled near zero. See footnote 19 for more
discussion of this.
have a posterior median above zero are defense, welfare, and space. The first two of these
are estimated fairly precisely as having values only slightly above zero, while the spending
level for space exploration is estimated with a huge amount of uncertainty.20
Most other policy positions are estimated to be quite a bit lower than zero, indicating
that most respondents prefer increased spending. Social security, the policy with the lowest
posterior median, is estimated to be at −2.89 with over 99% of respondents’ ideal points
20The reason for this uncertainty becomes clear when recalling the estimated discrimination parameter for
space from Figure 1. Space is the only spending area whose βj is not estimated to be clearly to one side of
zero. Because policy positions pj are calculated by dividing the average of the two cutpoints on an issue by
its discrimination parameter (Equation 3), policies for which the discrimination parameter is close to zero
will have policy positions estimated very imprecisely. The logic is that if responses regarding spending levels
on a specific issue, such as space here, are unrelated to respondents’ overall spending preferences, then these






Figure 4: Spending Preferences by Party ID, 2014 GSS. The blue solid line indicates
Democrats, red dashed Republicans, and gray dotted independents.
estimated to be to the right of the policy (the 95% HPD for the percentage of respondents
with spending preferences above this policy’s location is [98.9, 100]). Even policies with
higher estimated positions are estimated to be lower than large majorities of respondents’
preference. The estimated policy location for race, for example, is estimated to be lower
than the spending preferences of 71.6% of respondents (95% HPD [67.6, 75.3]). In fact,
fourteen out of the eighteen policy areas are estimated to be less than zero, meaning that
for the vast majority of areas surveyed in these data, spending levels are below the average
spending preference of the American public.21 Previous work finds that a large segment of
the American public is in favor of increased spending, so we view this as a positive check of
the face validity of our measure.
Given that the size of government is a central divide between the platforms of the modern
Democratic and Republican parties, we might expect there to exist large differences between
Democratic and Republican identifiers in the American public. Surprisingly, there is an ex-
tremely high amount of overlap between the spending preferences of Democratic, Republican,
and independent identifiers. Figure 4 plots the distribution of estimated spending preferences
21Of course, this could, and most likely would, change dramatically if we change the question as to make























(b) Spending preferences by income
Figure 5: Spending Preferences by Ideology and Income, 2014 GSS. Boxplots show distri-
bution of estimated spending preferences xi by self-placed ideology (left pane) and income
(right pane). The box begins at the 25th percentile and extends to the 75th percentile. The
bar represents the mean. The “whiskers” extend to the most extreme value within 1.5 IQRs.
Points more extreme than that are plotted as dots.
by party identification.22 The average spending preference among Democratic identifiers is
.24 (95% HPD [.21, .26]) while for Republicans it is −.32 (95% HPD [−.35,−.28]). The av-
erage independent spending preference is −.02 (95% HPD [−.06, .03]). This means that not
only are most spending policy positions lower than the average American’s preferences, but
14 out of the 18 policies are estimated to be lower than the average Republican citizen’s
overall spending preferences. Finding that Republicans are in favor of increased spending
on a wide range of policy issues is in line with previous research (see, for example Ellis and
Stimson 2012).
22Leaning independents are coded as partisans following Keith et al. (1992)
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Spending preferences show a slightly stronger relationship with self-placed ideology than
with party identification, shown in Figure 5a. Still, the average spending spending preference
among self-identified “extremely conservative” respondents is−.54, which is still above fifteen
out of the eighteen policies included in the 2014 GSS. In fact, defense is the only policy
position whose location is estimated to be between the average preferences of extreme liberals
and extreme conservatives.
Income seems to be more or less uncorrelated with spending preferences. Figure 5b shows
the breakdown of spending preferences by income. The distribution of spending preferences
by income level is in line with other recent work on this subject (Soroka and Wlezien 2008;
Ura and Ellis 2008; Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien 2017). Even though income inequality
historically high and still rising (Brandolini and Smeeding 2006), overall spending preferences
are strikingly similar across income levels.
Embedded in the 2014 GSS is a question-wording experiment in which half of the respon-
dents, randomly selected, were shown alternate question wordings for eleven of the eighteen
items as well as the remaining seven items for which there was only one wording. Some of
these changes (e.g. “space exploration” versus “space exploration program”) seem unlikely
to make a difference. Others, however, are quite different such as the two wordings on wel-
fare: “welfare” and “assistance to the poor,” paralleling classic examples of question wording
effects (Schuman and Presser 1981; Rasinski 1989). In subsubsection A.1.1, we analyze this,
including the standard and alternate wordings for each of these items as well as the questions
with only one wording, for a total of 29 items. For the majority of these alternate wordings,
item parameters were all similar. Four questions, however, showed significant differences:
welfare, cities, race, and crime.23 As subsubsection A.1.1 shows, the overall results presented
23Welfare comes as no surprise, given the difference in question wording. One of crime’s wordings is
“halting the increasing crime rate,” which is an odd way to phrase the question given that crime rate in the
U.S. has been on the decline for a few decades. This rather odd question phrasing may be to blame for the
different item parameters. It is unclear why the parameters with cities are different. Aside from these three,
there were some other very minor differences with the cutpoints for two questions (drugs and foreign aid).
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above are similar whether using only the standard question wordings or including alternate
wordings as separate items.
This section’s findings demonstrate that the mass public is not highly polarized in terms
of their spending preferences. Citizens show only minor differences in spending preferences
by party identification, and only slightly larger differences by self-placed ideology. There
are virtually no differences in spending preferences by income level. While this lack of
polarization might be expected to produce spending policies that are highly representative
of the median voter, this is not the case, at least judging by the spending policy locations
implied by respondents’ views. For the vast majority of areas, spending policy is estimated
to lie below, usually far below, the average respondent’s preferences, and few of the policy
locations are estimated to be close to the center of the distribution of citizen preferences. This
apparent skew in representation on spending policy begs the question of whether political
elites have different preferences from those of ordinary citizens, including whether they are
similarly homogeneous or whether they are more polarized by party in terms of their spending
preferences.
2.3 Adding Candidates’ Preferences
The above results shows that policies are not where most people want them — in fact,
they are oftentimes far below the median citizens’ preferences. There are several possible
explanations for this, one of which being that elites’ spending preferences do not look like
citizens’ spending preferences and since political elites make policy they are simply creating
policies that are more suited to their own preferences. Additionally, as we show in Figure 4,
spending preferences by party are not very polarized. Is this also the case for elites, or are
elites more sorted by party?
We focus here on estimating spending preferences of citizens and candidates for Congress
on the same scale. This requires data that asks the same (or at least similar) questions
of both sets of actors. For this, we rely on the National Political Awareness test (NPAT),
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which is a survey fielded to candidates for office by the organization Project Vote Smart
(see Ansolabehere, James Snyder, and III 2001; Shor and McCarty 2011; Richman 2011, for
previous research using these data.)24 Most importantly for our purposes, some waves of this
survey include questions about candidates’ relative spending preferences. The 1998 wave of
the NPAT was chosen because it provides the best combination of candidate response rate
and question overlap with the corresponding year for the GSS.25 Specifically, candidates are
asked across a range of different issues to “Indicate what levels of funding you support for
the following categories.” We drop all third party and independent candidates, leaving 449
major-party candidates who ran in the 1998 general election for congressional office.
Table 2 lists the specific policies candidates were asked about in the 1998 NPAT as well
as the percentage breakdown of responses. The NPAT and GSS provide slightly different
response options for spending questions, which we recode to correspond to obtain comparable
scales.26 The questions span a fairly wide range of policies across different issue areas.
In order to estimate the spending preferences of candidates alongside those of citizens,
we must match some of the questions in the GSS and NPAT. Fortunately, the question
wordings from the NPAT and GSS are very similar or identical for 7 out of 13 questions on
the NPAT. We were able to match questions about spending on the arts, education, the
environment, crime, space, and welfare. NPAT items on AIDS programs, housing projects,
job training programs, medicaid, medicare, and student loan programs did not have any
corresponding item in the GSS and therefore were not matched, but instead were included
24One potential objection to using NPAT data is that perhaps candidates who fill out these data are
unrepresentative of the larger group. Later, we compare candidates who completed the NPAT to those who
did not. Results do not indicate that NPAT respondents are dramatically different from non-respondents.
In 2010 this survey was renamed the Political Courage Test.
25In recent years, candidate response rates have dropped precipitously. Although the 1996 NPAT was
completed by more major-party candidates, it included fewer questions that matched well with GSS items
(5 for the 1996 NPAT vs. 7 for the 1998 wave).
26We recode the “greatly increase” and “slightly increase” questions from the NPAT to correspond to the
GSS response option of “too little.” We recode the “eliminate,” “greatly decrease,” and “slightly decrease”
on the NPAT to correspond to the GSS’s “too much” response, and we recode NPAT responses of “maintain
status” to match the GSS’s “about right” response.
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Table 2: Question wordings and proportion of candidates in each category for 1998 NPAT
Response percent
NPAT Question GSS match too much about right too little
AIDS programs N/A 15.2 44.4 40.5
Arts funding natarts 44.0 37.7 18.4
Education K-12 nateduc, nateducy 9.2 18.4 72.4
Environmental programs natenvir, natenviy 16.1 40.8 43.1
Foreign aid nataid, nataidy 52.7 40.9 6.5
Housing projects N/A 24.5 47.7 27.8
Job training programs N/A 15.0 30.9 54.1
Law enforcement natcrimy 5.6 30.9 63.6
Medicaid N/A 4.9 62.5 32.6
Medicare N/A 2.8 53.2 44.0
NASA natspace, natspacy 24.2 56.7 19.1
Student loan programs N/A 6.9 35.3 57.8
Welfare natfare 46.1 45.0 8.9
as separate items that candidates responded to, but citizens did not. The second column of
Table 2 indicates which GSS questions the NPAT items are combined with.
Table 3 shows the proportion of respondents in each response category of the 1998 GSS.
The 1998 GSS, like the 2014 version, included two question wordings for several of its items
with respondents randomized to either the standard or alternate wordings. In order to in-
clude all respondents from the 1998 GSS in the combined analyses (rather than dropping
roughly half of them), we had to make decisions about whether to combine different wordings
into a single item. In some cases, e.g. “space exploration program” versus “space explo-
ration,” it seems obvious that the questions can be combined. Others, however, such as
“welfare” versus “assistance to the poor” seem potentially problematic. In order to assess
whether it is reasonable to combine GSS question wordings, we estimated the model for the
GSS spending preferences data alone, treating each question wording as a separate item.
We then asked whether the parameter estimates between different wordings of the questions
showed notable differences. If they did not show differences, it seems reasonable to combine
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those different question wordings. We combined question wordings for seven out of the eleven
items with multiple wordings.27
Table 3: 1998 GSS Items
Response percent
Policy GSS variable name too much about right too little
Parks natpark 6.4 57.9 35.7
Roads natroad 10.1 49.6 40.3
Social security natsoc 6.7 34.0 59.4
Mass transportation natmass 10.7 53.5 35.9
Education (alt) nateducy 6.1 19.3 74.6
Crime (alt) natcrimy 8.1 36.5 55.4
Welfare (alt) natwelfy 11.5 26.2 62.3
Health (alt) nathealy 7.8 22.0 70.2
Environment (alt) natenviy 7.9 26.6 65.5
Foreign Aid (alt) nataidy 72.0 21.5 6.5
Defense (alt) natarmsy 32.1 49.2 18.7
Education nateduc 6.4 22.6 71.0
Health natheal 5.8 25.7 68.6
Drugs (alt) natdrugy 12.1 31.2 56.7
Space (alt) natspacy 42.3 45.6 12.1
Crime natcrime 7.2 29.5 63.3
Drugs natdrugy 9.8 29.3 60.9
Environment natenvir 8.0 29.3 62.7
Welfare natwelf 45.4 37.8 16.8
Defense natarms 32.2 49.3 18.6
Foreign Aid nataid 64.2 28.7 7.1
Space natspac 42.2 47.0 10.8
Race (alt) natracey 25.0 44.8 30.2
Race natrace 18.0 44.4 37.6
Big cities natcity 13.8 34.1 52.1
Arts natarts 22.4 52.5 25.2
Big cities (alt) natcityy 33.2 43.8 23.0
Among the questions where wordings were not combined, only crime and welfare have
corresponding NPAT items. In both of these cases, the choice of which GSS wording to match
27For five of these items (defense, law education, environment, health and space), the 95% HPDs for all
item parameters overlapped across question wordings. Only κ1 failed to overlap between wordings for the
foreign aid item and only κ2 failed to overlap (by .001) for the drugs item. Because of these relatively minor
differences, we combined the wordings of these two questions as well. The remaining four items showed





























Figure 6: Discrimination Parameter Estimates, 1998 GSS & NPAT. Dots indicate posterior
means, horizontal bars represent 95% HPDs.
to the NPAT question was clear because the NPAT question wordings —“welfare” and “law
enforcement” — match perfectly to a GSS wording, while the other question wording for
these items —“assistance to the poor” and “halting the rising crime rate” — seem quite
different. In both of these cases, the remaining GSS wording was treated as a separate item,
with no NPAT item matched to it.
As above, the model is identified by post-processing each iteration of the sampler to
impose the restriction that spending preferences (xi) for citizens and candidates together
have mean zero and variance one and that higher values represent preferences for more
spending. The sampler is run for 250,000 iterations with the first iterations 100,000 dropped
and each 25th iteration thereafter saved. Examination of multiple diagnostics showed strong
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Figure 7: Cutpoint Estimates, 1998 GSS & NPAT. Dots represent posterior means, horizontal
bars indicate 95% HPDs.
Figure 6 shows the estimated discrimination parameters for each item. As for the 2014
GSS, virtually all of these values are positive, indicating that higher overall spending prefer-
ences are positively associated with desire to increase spending levels. Only defense spending
is estimated to clearly have a negative discrimination parameter, while the discrimination
parameter for space overlaps zero, meaning that preferences for spending on space are un-
related to overall spending preferences. The cutpoints, shown in Figure 7 also show similar
characteristics, generally speaking, to those from the 2014 GSS.
Figure 8 shows the estimated locations for spending policy for each item. As before, the
dots represent posterior medians and the lines indicate 95% HPDs. The estimated spending
policy locations from the 1998 data are mostly concentrated between negative two and zero
as they were for the 2014 GSS. Only four policy areas — arts, foreign aid, welfare, and
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Figure 8: Policy Position Estimates, 1998 GSS & NPAT. Dots indicate posterior medians,
lines indicate 95% HPDs. The lower HPD bound for roads is not included, it is −14.3. The
median for space is −13.2 with an HPD of −197.6 to 194.1.
before, the spending location for space is estimated with a huge amount of uncertainty due
to the fact that the posterior for its discrimination parameter is concentrated near zero. The
largest outliers in spending policy locations are foreign aid, which is positioned far to the
right, and roads and crime (alternate version), which are estimated to be far to the left.
Figure 9 shows the distribution of estimated spending preferences for congressional can-
didates and respondents to the GSS, separated by party. As for the 2014 GSS, citizen
spending preferences show little evidence of polarization. The preferences of Democrats,
independents, and Republicans differ by a small amount on average and there is a very high
amount of overlap between the distributions for each of these groups. Only seven percent of










(b) Spending preferences of candidates
Figure 9: Spending Preferences of Individuals and Candidates. Panes plot density of esti-
mated spending preferences xi for 1998 GSS respondents (top pane) and congressional can-
didates from the 1998 NPAT (bottom pane) separated by partisanship from joint scaling of
these two datasets
Among congressional candidates, there is evidence of more polarization, but the spending
preference distributions are still relatively similar. While thirty-five percent of the variation
in candidate spending preferences is explained by party, there is still a much higher degree
of overlap between Democratic and Republican candidates’ spending preferences than there
is between, for example, the DW-NOMINATE scores of the survey’s candidates (Poole and
Rosenthal 2000) or the cfscores estimated by Bonica (2013b).
More than just examining the respective shapes of citizen and candidate spending pref-
erence distributions, however, our joint scaling allows us to answer questions about the
preferences of these two groups compared to each other. The overall variation in candidate
spending preferences is only slightly larger than that for citizens (standard deviations of xi
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are 1.16 and .97, respectively). Perhaps even more surprisingly, the within-party variation
for citizens and candidates is similar.28
This result contrasts with those of Bafumi and Herron (2010), who look not at spending
preferences but at overall policy ideology estimated for members of Congress and the public.
Bafumi and Herron find that the distribution of legislator ideology is quite bimodal, with
most citizens holding ideological positions in between these two modes. Our results show
that on spending preferences, at least those stated by candidates in the NPAT survey, candi-
dates positions are much more unimodal (note that if pane (b) of Figure 9 were plotted for all
candidates rather than separately by party, the distribution would look roughly normal, in
contrast to Bafumi and Herron’s distribution of estimated ideology in which Democratic leg-
islators are almost completely separated from Republican legislators with very few estimated
to be in the middle range near the median American).29
A potential objection to looking at NPAT respondents is that they are unrepresentative of
the overall population of candidates. Although other research (Ansolabehere, James Snyder,
and III 2001; Shor and McCarty 2011; Richman 2011) suggests this is not the case, especially
when response rates were still relatively high as in the 1998 NPAT, we investigate whether
non-respondents look different than candidates who respond to the NPAT.
Using data from Bonica (2013a), we were able to successfully merge nearly all of the
candidates in our dataset with data including election results and other candidate informa-
tion.30 Evidence suggests that NPAT respondents and non-respondents are very similar.
We ran differences in means tests between candidates who responded to the NPAT vs those
who did not across several candidate characteristics. Insignificant results included cfscores
(p = 0.39), DW-NOMINATE (p = 0.65), party (p = 0.91), and gender (p = 0.92).
28The standard deviations for Democratic and Republican candidate xi distributions are .92 and 1.03, re-
spectively. For respondents, these values are .91, .95, and .97 for Democrats, Independents, and Republicans,
respectively
29Note also that estimated candidate spending preferences do not show large differences for incumbents,
challengers, and open seat candidates.
30Only 54 major-party candidates from the 1998 NPAT did not appear in Bonica’s data. Many of these
are candidates who did not perform well (under 30% of the popular vote, for example).
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Variables that had a statistically different mean between respondents and non-respondents
included whether the candidate won or lost (p = 0.03, 47% of people who responded were
winners vs 40% of non-responders) and the number of contributors to a candidates’ cam-
paign (p = 0.003, candidates who responded have more givers on average (mean= 342.2)
than those who did not (mean= 229.9)). Overall, these results suggest that while there are
some candidate characteristics that correlate with nonresponse, the candidates responding
to the NPAT do not look dramatically different from those who did not.
We also looked at how different our spending preference estimates are from ideal points
that are designed to capture overall ideology. Evidence suggests that, while correlated,
spending preferences and overall ideology are different. Our point estimates are correlated
with Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores (based on voting behavior) at r =
−0.76. They are correlated with Bonica’s estimates (based on campaign contributions) at
r = −0.66. Even with the relatively high correlations between these measures, they tell
different stories, particularly about partisan polarization. That spending preferences are
different from ideology may also explain why we find only slight polarization at the elite
level. Polarization here is estimated to be minimal with regard to spending preferences,
while other measures that include a mix of different issues (e.g. gay marriage, abortion,
immigration, etc) show a much wider gulf between parties.
2.4 Examining Joint Scaling Assumptions
A key assumption of the joint scaling of citizen and candidate data above is that the same
single-dimensional structure underlies the views of both groups. Obviously, this is implausi-
ble in an exact sense, but the important question for our purposes is whether the two groups’
preferences are primarily explained by a similar enough underlying dimension to make jointly
estimating their preferences on the same scale a useful and interesting exercise.
In order to assess this, we conduct three sets of analyses, each directed at a different
question. First, we separately examine the variance explained by the principal components of
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the GSS and NPAT datasets. This gives a sense for how much of the variation in citizens’ and
in candidates’ spending preferences are explained by a single spending dimension. Second,
we conduct an exploratory factor analysis of both of these groups’ spending responses and
compare the factor loadings from each one. This allows us to compare the way individual
spending items (e.g. “Defense” or “Welfare”) relate to the underlying spending dimension
for each of these groups and whether these relationships are similar between the two groups.
Finally, we relax the model estimated in subsection 2.3 to allow citizens to have different
utility error variances than candidates in order to determine if this changes our central
findings.
Dimensionality of NPAT and GSS Data
Figure 10 presents scree plots of the GSS and NPAT data based on a principal components
analysis.31 Both plots show a high value for the first principal component, with a relatively
large decline for the second, and smaller drops after that. This “leveling out” of the scree
plot after a single value is typically interpreted as evidence of a strongly single-dimensional
structure for the data. Although other cutoffs (e.g. which principal components have values
greater than one) are sometimes used, there are no hard and fast rules for interpreting
scree plots. What these plots both show, however, is that a single spending dimension can
explain a large proportion of the variance in both citizens’ and candidates’ responses to
spending questions. Although subsequent dimensions can add explanatory power, each one
contributes much less than does the first dimension. So although these datasets are not
exactly single-dimensional, a single-dimensional analysis is likely to contribute quite a bit to
our understanding of the spending preferences of these two groups.
31This analysis was done using the princomp function in R. Because GSS respondents were randomized
on questions with two versions to either get all standard question wordings or all alternate wordings (not
independent randomization across questions), we dropped all alternate wordings from this analysis. This is
done since no respondents answered both a standard and an alternate wording and therefore the correlations
between these items, which are needed for the principal components analysis, cannot be calculated. Results
from instead dropping the standard wordings of items with two versions were very similar.
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Figure 10: Scree Plots for GSS and NPAT Items. Dots represent variance explained for
the first ten principal components of 1998 GSS and NPAT data. Because of lack of overlap
between questions asked, the alternate wordings for GSS questions are dropped from the
analysis.
Structure of Citizen and Candidate Spending Preferences
Another worry we may have is whether congressional candidates and individuals have differently-
structured spending preferences. Jessee (2016), for example, discusses this issue in the con-
text of estimating the policy ideologies of citizens and members of Congress. One way of
examining whether the single dimensional structures underlying each of these two datasets
is similar is by looking at factor loadings from factor analysis. Figure 11 shows the factor
loadings from separate unidimensional factor analyses of merged items from the NPAT and
GSS data (see Table 2). Although the separate analyses don’t produce factor loadings that
are directly comparable on the same numerical scale (for example, a value of 0.6 for an
NPAT factor loading doesn’t necessarily mean the same thing as the same value for a GSS
factor loading), we can see whether the general pattern of loadings is similar. It is clear
from Figure 11 that these loadings are indeed very similar overall, with a relatively linear
relationship existing between the two sets of estimates. The items with factor loadings near


























Figure 11: Factor Loadings for 1998 GSS and NPAT Items. Dots represent factor loadings
from separate factor analyses of matched items from both datasets.
the NPAT, also tend to be the ones that have factor loadings close to zero in the GSS data.
Conversely, those with larger factor loadings in the NPAT also tend to have larger factor
loadings in the GSS. This suggests that the primary dimension underlying citizens’ and can-
didates’ spending preferences in these common items is structured in a similar way. To the
extent that there are some differences between these two groups’ preference structures, the
much larger number of GSS respondents as compared to the number of NPAT candidates
should make the estimated dimension closer to that for citizens than for candidates. Thus
our findings can be interpreted as answering questions about how citizens perceive spending
policy levels and candidates’ stated spending positions.
Heteroskedastic Errors for Citizens and Candidates
As a final robustness check for our item response theory model, we estimate a model in which
the variance of the latent-scale disturbance (error) term is allowed to be different for citizens
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and candidates.32 Following previous work by Jessee (2009) and Lauderdale (2010), this
allows for the possibility that ordinary citizens might take positions on individual policies
with more “noise” than candidates who have otherwise identical overall spending preferences.
This might not be unexpected given that candidates are essentially professional position
takers.33 Although they aren’t strictly comparable as noted above, the factor loadings from
the NPAT and GSS data shown in Figure 11 also provide some suggestion that candidates
discriminate more precisely along this spending dimension.
The results of this heteroskedastic model indeed suggest that ordinary citizens have a
higher standard deviation in their position taking than do candidates. The posterior mean
for respondent error standard deviation is 1.41, with a 95% HPD of [1.31, 1.52]. Although
this is not a large difference, we may wonder whether the discrepancy between citizens and
candidates affects any of the findings above. In all cases, however, estimates of the model’s
other parameters (the distribution of individuals’ spending preferences, item discrimination
parameters, item cutpoints, policy locations) are nearly identical between the homoskedastic
and heteroskedastic models and all of the substantive findings above are the same regardless
of which of these two models is used.
2.5 Discussion
The United States federal government spends each year an amount of money that is unfath-
omable for many people. Hundreds of billions of dollars are spent on defense alone. The
same goes for spending on various welfare programs. In total, the U.S. federal government
spends about one of every five dollars spent in the United States each year. Thus, if we
are interested in studying public opinion on spending, it is important to measure spending
32Formally, we fix the standard deviation of the errors εij from Equation 1 at 1 for all candidates and esti-
mate a common standard deviation for εij for all respondents, using a Cauchy prior with scale 1,000 truncated
below zero for this parameter. The model is otherwise identical to the main one used in subsection 2.3.
33It is also possible that some kinds of individuals have a larger or smaller error variance. While a full,
systematic examination of that possibility is outside the scope of this analysis, previous research suggests
that citizens actually respond quite similarly to policy regardless of their level of political sophistication
(Enns and Kellstedt 2008).
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preferences correctly. In this paper, we develop an item response model that allows us to
scale multiple questions about spending preferences together in order to measure individuals’
overall spending preferences. We find that people and candidates generally prefer increased
spending on many, but not all, policy areas, consistent with other research in this area. We
also find that party polarization in the public is very low, nearly nonexistent. Candidates
show more polarization than do citizens, but they are not nearly as polarized on spending
as they are on measures of overall ideology.
Our model has several advantages over previous attempts at scaling spending preferences.
Whereas some previous papers construct an additive index (Ura and Ellis 2012, for example)
or make assumptions about which items scale and which do not (Jacoby 2000), our method
allows issues to be related to overall spending preferences at different strengths. We show
that it is in fact the case that some spending on some issues (like education) is very closely
related to overall spending preferences, whereas spending on other issues (like space) is not.
Furthermore, this method is flexible enough to indicate whether an issue (defense spending,
in our case) is actually negatively related to overall spending preferences.
The flexibility of the model allows us to jointly scale various actors as long as they
answer the same questions. In our analysis, we concentrated on the public and congressional
candidates, but this could be extended to, for example, interest groups, so long as they
answer survey questions. Placing interest groups in the same space would, subject to some
assumptions, allow researchers to compare spending preferences of these groups with their
members and each other. Additionally, our model is flexible enough to apply across different
years and different question sets. A final advantage of this method is that it generates
measures of uncertainty, something not possible with a simpler indexing method.
We take advantage of this to include candidates’ spending preferences as well as indi-
viduals’ in order to study polarization at the elite and mass level. We find that citizens
exhibit very low levels of polarization by partisanship. Congressional candidates are more
polarized than citizens, but their level of polarization on spending preferences is quite a bit
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lower than what is seen in most general policy-based ideology estimates. This suggests that,
while voters often face choices in terms of overall ideology between Democratic candidates
who are much more liberal and Republican candidates who are much more conservative than
their own views as shown by Bafumi and Herron (2010), the choices between candidates in
terms of spending tend to be less stark.
Our model also includes a point at which individuals who respond “about right” are esti-
mated to be indifferent over increasing or decreasing spending.34 In other words, individuals
are acting as if policy is located there. According to our analysis there is strong sentiment
among both citizens and Democratic candidates for higher levels of spending than currently
exist in most areas. Republican candidates also usually prefer more spending, though less
strongly than Democratic candidates. In a sense this represents a puzzle — if most citizens
and most candidates from both parties would prefer to see spending in an area increased,
why doesn’t it happen? The likely explanation comes from the common tendency to want
have one’s cake and eat it too. Voters typically desire, and candidates often promise, more
spending, lower taxes, and smaller deficits despite the mathematical impossibility of many of
these claims (see also Citrin 1979). In light of this, one might dismiss these results as simply
reflecting “cheap talk” by candidates about what policies they would support if elected. But
the fact that candidates find it advantageous to support these types of policies highlights the
importance of studying the spending positions of candidates and the spending preferences
of citizens.
One limitation of our modeling strategy compared to previous strategies is that it is
more difficult to make comparisons across time. For example, we cannot estimate the model
across years nor directly compare ideal points across years without making implausible as-
sumptions.35 So we cannot directly compare how our model relates to the “mood” measure
34In fact, the model is general enough to be applied to many situations with an ordered trichotomous
response. For example, survey questions with the common “like”, “neutral”, “dislike” response option would
also be good fits for this model, assuming multiple questions that all rely on some latent trait.
35For example, we could assume that either the distribution of ideal points or the locations of spending
policies are constant across time, both of which seem problematic.
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developed by Stimson (1991), for example. What we can compare with some additional
assumptions are differences within years over time. So, for example, if we were interested
in comparing the difference between Democratic and Republican spending preferences over
time using our modeling strategy, we could estimate the model separately for each year, com-
pute the average distance between Democrats and Republicans, and compare these numbers
over years. This would give us insight into the degree to which the parties are polarized with
regard to spending preferences and how that polarization varies over time. Similar methods
could be used to study various other phenomena with regard to spending preferences such as
the differences between candidates and voters, or winning candidates and losing candidates.
Finally, our approach could be used to assess the degree to which the estimated policy loca-




Research by political scientists demonstrates that public policy responds to public opinion.36
These policy changes in turn create a feedback loop where the public eases its current
demands when governments move in the direction of their previous ones (for examples,
see Wlezien 1995; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). This
has important implications for the role of public opinion in democracies, as it indicates that
the public responds to policy changes, and that policy changes in response to public opinion.
However, previous studies have made an assumption that may not be warranted. They
assume that all members of the public react to policy changes in parallel. Given the consistent
findings of “parallel publics” by Page and Shapiro (1992) and others, this assumption may
be reasonable. However, assuming that partisans react similarly to policy change runs in the
face of considerable research showing that partisanship colors perceptions and preferences
(Angus Campbell et al. 1960; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Soroka and Wlezien
2008; Enns and Kellstedt 2008; Johnson and Kellstedt 2013; Gonthier 2016), as well as other
research that argues that we are seeing a steady increase in polarization in the American
public (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Webster and Abramowitz 2017; though see Fiorina,
Abrams, and Pope 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008).
In this paper, I identify three specific mechanisms that should all lead to partisan dif-
ferences in policy feedback. Specifically, in comparison to supports of the non-incumbent
party, supporters of the incumbent party (1) may not monitor government action as carefully,
(2) may process information differently, and (3) may change their preferences to align with
government policy. All three predict that responsiveness is heterogeneous, with supporters of
the incumbent party being less responsive. I refer to this difference as “partisan feedback.”
In the next section, I briefly review what we know about policy feedback, and then
explain how each of the three mechanisms impact specific elements on the model, yielding a
36This chapter is a version of (Branham 2018), published by Public Opinion Quarterly. The version of
record is online.
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testable hypothesis. I then qualify this hypothesis further, by suggesting that it will be more
evident in highly polarized issues. I then test these expectations using opinion and policy
data from the United States from 1973 to 2014. I test a model of partisan feedback at the
individual level across eight issue areas. Analysis reveals that (1) the thermostatic model
works well at the individual level as well as the aggregate level (2) partisan feedback does
occur (3) partisan feedback tends to occur in issue areas with relatively large disagreement
across partisan lines.
3.1 Opinion Responsiveness
Changes in public policy can produce changes in public opinion. Sometimes, we observe
positive feedback; that is, the more policy people get, the more they want (Pacheco 2013a).
Individuals’ reactions to policy can also depend on context. For example, individuals’ support
for immigration depends on policy (the amount of immigration), but that appears to be
conditional on context (the level of segregation in their area; Rocha and Espino 2009).
Other times, the public does not respond at all to policy change (Soss and Schram 2007;
Wlezien 2016). Policies can also affect political behavior, not just political opinions (for a
review of recent literature, see Andrea Campbell 2012).
The thermostatic model is one model of how public opinion can respond to changes in
policy. It asserts that increases in policy are associated with decreases in demand for more
of that policy. In other words, if government increases the amount of policy, then fewer
people prefer further increases of that policy. This relationship has been studied extensively
at the national level in the US (Wlezien 1995; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Ellis
and Faricy 2011), the U.S. state level (Pacheco 2013b), as well as cross-nationally (Soroka
and Wlezien 2010).
Studying the opinion-policy loop requires measurements of people’s preferences. We
usually ask people their relative preferences (for more or less policy) rather than their absolute
preferences (an amount of policy) due to the complicated nature of decisions and choices
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in politics. For example, while naming an exact dollar amount they want the government
to spend on national defense is probably outside the capacity of most people, giving a
relative preference — whether they prefer more or less than what the government is spending
currently — is a much less demanding task. These survey questions generally ask people
whether they think we’re spending too much, about the right amount, or too little across
several different policy areas.
I follow previous literature in conceptualizing individuals’ relative preferences R for more
or less spending as being the difference between their absolute preference P ∗ and where they
think policy P currently is. This relationship is captured in Equation 4.
R = P ∗ − P (4)
Relative preferences (R) depend on two things: both what an individuals’ preferred policy
position is (P ∗), as well as where policy is now (P ). This logic is at the heart of the
thermostatic model. Given absolute preferences, if policy changes, then relative preferences
should change in the opposite direction. In other words, if spending goes up (P increases)
and absolute preferences do not change (P ∗ remains constant), then an individual should be
more likely to say that there is too much spending (R will decrease).
If we are interested in the effect of policy change on relative preferences, we can model
R as a function of P :
Rij = β0 + β1Pij + βWij + εij (5)
where R represents individual i’s relative opinion (see Equation 4) for more or less spending
on policy j. P represents the dollar amount spent and W represents a vector of variables
meant to capture P ∗ since P ∗ is not directly observable.37 Therefore, β1 gives us information
about the effect of policy on opinion. Negative values are evidence that as spending on a
policy increases, people are less likely to prefer additional spending.
37The β term associated with W is a vector of coefficients.
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3.2 The Role of Partisanship
Partisanship is oftentimes a moderating variable in the kinds of relationships political scien-
tists tend to study. People tend to form their partisan attachments young, and to interpret
a lot of information through partisan “lenses” (Angus Campbell et al. 1960). Partisanship
affects other areas of life as well, such as happiness (Pierce, Rogers, and Jason Snyder 2016),
trust in government (Keele 2005), and preference formation (Mullinix 2016; Lerman and
McCabe 2017). We also know that partisanship has a causal influence on people’s political
preferencecs (Gerber, Huber, and Washington 2010).
What we already know about partisanship suggests that partisans should react differ-
ently to policy changes. However, previous work on thermostatic feedback finds only limited
differences across partisan groups. Soroka and Wlezien (2010) find that Democrats, Inde-
pendents, and Republicans (as well as partisan groups in Canada and the UK) respond very
similarly to policy change. Ura and Ellis (2012) also find that partisan “mood” tends to
move in parallel over time, but may be polarizing slightly in recent years. However, in this
paper I argue that we should expect differences across partisan groups based not only on an
individual’s party, but also party control of government. We know, for example, that party
control of government influences individuals” trust of particular institutions (Gershtenson,
Ladewig, and Plane 2006). This has important implications for opinion change. If a per-
son’s fellow partisans have control over the government, we should see less responsiveness
to policy changes. And, inversely, if the opposite party controls the government, we expect
those people’s opinions to be more responsive to policy change.
There are several likely mechanisms at work here. If we conceptualize relative preferences
R as the difference between absolute preferences P ∗ and policy P (as in Equation 4), then
differences in the thermostatic model must arise from either differences in changes in policy
or changes in preferences. I discuss both of these possibilities in turn, starting with changes
in policy.
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3.2.1 Explanation 1: Changes in Policy
One possibility is that partisans see P — policy — differently from one another. Of course,
in a certain sense this makes no sense; there is a single dollar amount spent by the U.S. on
defense each year. We do know, however, that in other domains where there is a correct
answer, partisan differences can emerge (Bartels 2002; Gerber and Huber 2010). So when
we discuss differences in policy, we are really talking about differences in people’s beliefs
about where policy is. Phrased alternatively, partisan groups have differing beliefs about the
magnitude and/or direction of policy change. In this section, I propose two different mech-
anisms that could be at work here: differences in monitoring and differences in information
processing.
Partisan groups may monitor the government’s actions more closely if the government is
controlled by the opposite party. In other words, these groups are more attentive to changes
in P . The logic here is simple. Once your party has control of government, you can relax —
your job is done and you trust your fellow partisans in government to get the job done (Keele
2005; Gershtenson, Ladewig, and Plane 2006). Conversely, if your party loses and is out of
government, you may feel the need to increase your watchfulness of what the government is
doing.
If this is the case, then “in-partisans” (partisans whose party controls government) and
“out-partisans” may update their beliefs about the location of P differently from one another.
In other words, they can differ in how they update their beliefs about the magnitude and/or
direction of change in P . Since policy today (Pt) is simply the sum of yesterday’s policy
(Pt−1) and whatever changed (∆Pt) if people fail to observe ∆Pt then they will not adjust
their opinions thermostatically.38 While total failure to pay attention to policy change is an
extreme case, especially if the issue is at least somewhat salient, it could be the case that
in-partisans may be less observant of governmental actions on average than out-partisans.
38Unless they happen to update their absolute preferences P ∗ in the opposite direction of policy change.
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If that is the case, we will observe in-partisans as behaving less thermostatically than out-
partisans.
Differences in monitoring (in other words, the reception of information about policy
change) can produce differences in thermostatic feedback. However, another plausible mech-
anism is that the same information may be considered differently by partisan groups. Par-
tisans may disagree on the magnitude (or direction) of policy change; Republicans in the
electorate may view policy changes by Democrats in government as being large, whereas
Democrats in the electorate may view the same change as being small.39 These differing
reactions to perceived changes are well-documented and studied in the literature (for exam-
ple Bartels 2002; Bullock 2009; Bullock et al. 2015). Put alternatively, partisans may give
the government more leeway to change policy when it is controlled by their party. If it is
the case that one group views a policy change as larger in magnitude than another group,
then the first will behave more thermostatically. The result of this is that partisan groups
under-react to policy change from their own party and overreact to policy change from the
other party.
3.2.2 Explanation 2: Changes in Absolute Preferences
Because relative preferences contain information about absolute preferences and (belief
about) policy, it is possible that even if partisans update their beliefs about policy iden-
tically, they can still show differences across partisan lines if they change their absolute
preferences (P ∗) differently. We know that party greatly affects political preferences (An-
gus Campbell et al. 1960; Cohen 2003; Gerber, Huber, and Washington 2010; Colombo and
Kriesi 2016).
In particular, we know that sometimes partisans update their preferences to be more in
line with what their partisan elites are signaling (Cohen 2003; Ray 2003; Lenz 2009; Brader
and Tucker 2012). In other words, partisans in the electorate cue take from their party elite.
39Of course, there is a “correct” answer to the spending change, since we can measure this in dollar terms.
However, reasonable people can still disagree over whether a given change is “small” or “large.”
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Furthermore, the literature on partisan motivated reasoning suggests that partisans may
support (or oppose) policies that they would otherwise oppose (or support) based on which
party is offering the policy (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2013). And, in fact, signals from
the opposing party may in fact be more powerful than signals from partisans’ own parties
(Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009).
Given this, we might expect that individuals’ responses to policy spending changes may
depend on their partisanship. If partisans are more likely to take their party’s position as
their own, then they should move their absolute preferences (P ∗) to be more in line with
the policies that their party is proposing. Conversely, out-partisans may be more responsive
than they would be otherwise as they shift their absolute preferences away from what the
other party is doing. To be clear, individuals receive (and may react to) cues from both
parties as these parties either justify (if in power) or criticize (if in opposition) spending
(Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009).
In the context of the model at hand, partisans could cue take from the direction of spend-
ing. If a Democrat-controlled government spends more on policy X, then Democrats in the
electorate could adjust their preferred level of policy X up. At the same time, Republicans in
the electorate may adjust their preferred level of spending on policy X down. If that is what
happens, then Democrats would appear to behave less thermostatically than Republicans.
To see this, consider our conceptualization of R, Equation 4. Relative preferences are a
function of absolute preferences and policy. If both P ∗ (on the left side, as a constituent part
of R) and P (on the right hand side) move in tandem from t− 1 to t, then this will force β1
towards zero, all else equal. In other words, if in-partisans move their absolute preferences
in the same direction as policy change, we will find evidence of little or no thermostatic
feedback. Conversely, should out-partisans move their absolute preferences in the opposite
direction of policy change, then we should find evidence of greater thermostatic feedback.
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3.2.3 Partisan feedback
If individuals’ reactions to policy changes depend on whether or not their party is in control
of government, as suggested above, we need to modify Equation 5 to account for this:
Rij = β0 + β1Pij + β2Iij + β3PIij + βWij + εij (6)
where the variables are the same as above. We have added a new term, however. I represents
whether they are “in-partisans,” and PI is the interaction of policy P and I. Thus, for in-
partisans, their responsiveness to policy change is governed by β1+β3. Responsiveness of out-
partisans, on the other hand, is simply β1. Recall that if individuals behave thermostatically,
then β1 will be negative. Therefore, if in-partisans react less strongly to policy change, β3
will be positive (making the overall effect of P on R less negative).
3.2.4 Considering Issue Characteristics
Of course, not all issues are the same. One issue-specific characteristics that may affect
partisan feedback is the extent to which there is disagreement across partisan groups. We
expect to see greater differences in thermostatic behavior when partisans have different
opinions. On some issues, there are smaller disagreements across party lines. On other
issues, there is much larger disagreement. Areas with large disagreement across partisan
lines seem to be more likely to display partisan feedback, as it is these areas where partisans
think less like each other.
Let us investigate the degree to which partisans agree or disagree with each other.40 In
order to look at partisan disagreement, we can calculate net support for additional spending
by each party41 To do this, we simply take the proportion of people who want more spending
and subtract the proportion of people who indicate they prefer less spending. So the score for
one group can range between −100 (if everyone prefers less spending) and 100 (if everyone
40The data are described in more detail in subsection 3.3, below.
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Figure 12: Net support by partisanship and year across issues. Net support is calculated by
taking the percent of each group who prefer more spending minus the percent who prefer less.
Democratic net support is represented by the solid blue line and Republican net support is
represented by the dashed red line.
prefers more spending).42 Figure 12 plots net support by partisanship over time. Democrats
are represented by the solid blue line and Republican net support by the dashed red line.
Several things are apparent from this figure. First is that there is clear partisan disagree-
ment on many issues; the two lines are only rarely at the same point at the same time for
any issue, with the exception of crime. Second is that Republican net support is lower than
Democrats on average in all issue areas save spending on defense. Third is that the two
groups do trend together. When net support among Republicans rises (or falls), net support
among Democrats tends to rise (or fall) as well. Finally, although it is difficult to tell with
any degree of precision just by looking at Figure 12, we might suspect that in recent years
42Statistics in this section combine data from two question wordings so as to be consistent with the rest
of the paper. See footnote 45 for more details.
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Table 4: Disagreement and salience by issue area
Issue Mean disagree Min disagree Max disagree NYT salience MIP salience
Welfare 32.87 17.03 (1978) 50.77 (2010) 0.55 5.03
Defense 26.33 8.26 (1976) 56.40 (2014) 3.48 8.63
Health 23.67 9.34 (1974) 52.36 (2010) 3.68 6.33
Big cities 23.63 12.65 (1990) 42.56 (2012) 1.63 0.03
Environment 20.53 0.29 (1990) 46.83 (2010) 1.60 1.12
Education 17.34 0.37 (1990) 27.22 (1973) 2.52 2.57
Foreign Aid 7.36 0.11 (1974) 22.05 (2012) NA NA
Crime 3.5 0.05 (2002) 9.90 (1977) 6.28 9.30
Measures of disagreement are constructed by taking the absolute value of the difference in net support by
each year. In all issue areas except defense, Republican net support is lower on average than Democratic
net support. The NYT measure is a measure of how often each issue appears on the front page. MIP
measures the average percent of respondents listing each issue area as the most important problem. Data
for the NYT and MIP are from the Policy Agendas Project.
the gap in net support between the two parties has increased for many of the policies at
hand. This is in line with what Ura and Ellis (2012) find.
However, if we are interested in how much partisans agree or disagree on issues, we can
construct a simpler measure by taking the absolute value of the difference of net support
between the two groups. That is, we subtract the net support of Republicans from the net
support of Democrats, take the absolute value, and average across years. Table 4 presents
averages and extrema for this measure of partisan disagreement.
The magnitude of net support disagreement varies quite a bit across issues. Support for
additional spending on foreign aid and crime appears to be relatively similar across partisan
lines. This means that the average Democrat is only slightly more in favor of increased
spending than the average Republican. Other issue areas exhibit much larger differences;
in particular, welfare, defense, health, and big cities exhibit the largest differences by party,
while the environment and education exhibit smaller, but still large differences. Thus, we
might expect to find the largest differences in thermostatic feedback across partisan groups
in these four issue areas. However, we must also take into account another issue-specific
characteristic: salience.
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Issues that are not salient are much less likely to exhibit thermostatic behavior; the
public simply isn’t paying much attention to those issues. If the public does not know much
about an issue, then there is little reason to suspect that partisans react differently from
each other. There are at least two common ways of constructing a measure of salience. The
most common measure relies on the so-called “most important problem” questions regularly
asked by polling organizations, which contain information about both importance and the
extent to which an issue area is a problem (Wlezien 2005). Another way of attempting to
measure salience is through counting how often the issue area appears in newspapers like
the New York Times. Averages of both of these measures are shown in Table 4. Defense,
health, crime, and education are among the most salient issues according to both measures.
The MIP measure suggests that welfare should also be salient, though the NYT measure
does not. Given that welfare is a common issue in campaign rhetoric, it seems like the MIP
measure may be more reliable here. The environment and big cities are not rated as salient
by either measure. Although neither asked about foreign aid, we know from previous work
that we should not expect to observe thermostatic feedback in foreign aid because it is a
low-salience issue where opinions are unrelated to policy status quo (Soroka and Wlezien
2010; Wlezien 2016).
Recall that theoretically, we expect to see partisan feedback on issues with relatively
large disagreement across partisan lines. If partisans react differently to policy change on
salient, high-disagreement issues, then we should expect to see differences in thermostatic
responsiveness in welfare, defense, and health. We may also see partisan feedback in the
environment and education, where there appears to be large disagreement, but it may not
be as salient. We do not expect to see partisan feedback in big cities, foreign aid, or crime.43
43In foreign aid and crime, partisans largely agree. big cities and foreign aid are low-salience issues.
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3.3 Data & Measurement
In order to estimate Equation 6, we need data on political opinions, partisanship, sociode-
mographic information, and spending on public policy. For opinion, partisanship, and so-
ciodemocraphic information, I use data from the 1973–2014 General Social Survey, run by
NORC at the University of Chicago. The survey aims to collect a nationally representa-
tive sample of U.S. adults and ran almost yearly from 1973–1994 then biannually afterward.
Dropping independents from the sample means that the analysis relies on 46,115 observa-
tions.44
For spending data, I use the Historical Tables from the Office of Management and Budget.
The OMB reports spending data according to function and subfunction. So, for example,
under function “350 — Agriculture” we can find subfunctions “351 — Farm income stabi-
lization” and “352 — Agriculture research and services.” I follow the methods employed by
Soroka and Wlezien (2010, page 184) in order to aggregate spending data to the policy areas
that the GSS asks about. Areas common to both the GSS and Historical Tables include
welfare, big cities, health, the environment, education, foreign aid, crime, and defense. All
dollar amounts are inflation-adjusted tens of billions of 2000 dollars.
The W term represents a host of variables meant to capture change in P ∗. We can
think about these in terms of individual-level variables meant to capture variation across
individuals and year-level variables meant to capture variation across years. In this analysis,
individual-level variables included are sex, race, education, region, and which question version
the respondent received.45 For defense, two other variables are added. One captures how the
44Following Keith et al. (1992), I code partisan “leaners” as partisans, only dropping “true” independents.
A separate analysis on independents shows that independents do not react differently to policy change under
a Republican or a Democrat, with the exception of defense spending, where they appear to respond more
strongly to spending by Republicans.
45For the relative preference questions, the GSS embeds a question wording experiment. Half of respon-
dents receive one version of the question and half another. For example, half of respondents are asked about
whether we spend too little, too much, or about the right amount on “the military, armaments, and defense,”
whereas the other half are asked about “national defense.” Some of these question wordings (like defense)
seem to make little difference. Others, (such as asking about “welfare” versus “assistance to the poor”)
make quite a large difference. In order to include as many respondents as possible, I merge responses to both
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respondent feels towards Russia, which has been found in previous work to be a good proxy
for the “hotness” of the Cold War (and thus related to spending preferences for defense;
Wlezien 1995).46 The second variable is an attempt to account for a potential increase in
absolute preferences for defense spending associated with the attacks on September 11th.
It is coded as an indicator variable that is a 1 between 2001 and 2010 and a 0 otherwise.47
Year-level variables included in the model are a counter, which allows for a linear trend for
increasing (or decreasing) absolute preferences over time.48
Measuring I is tricky because in the United States, it is rarely the case that one party
“controls” government. The separation of elections of the House, Senate, and Presidency
means that one party usually controls at least one of those three policymaking institutions.
For this article, I measure I as an indicator variable for whether or not a person is of the
same party as the president. In U.S. politics, the president (and their party) tend to get
credit for when the country is doing well and blamed when it is not, even if they have little
to do with it (see, for example MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). Let us now turn to
the analysis.
3.4 Analysis
In order to estimate differences in partisan responsiveness, we will estimate Equation 6.
Responsiveness of out-partisans is represented by β1 (the coefficient associated with P , since
I is zero for out-partisans) and in-partisan responsiveness is governed by β1 + β3. The
hypothesis is that for salient issue areas with disagreement across partisan lines (welfare,
health, and defense), β3 will be positive, indicating that in-partisans react less strongly to
policy changes than out-partisans. Conversely, for low-salience areas, or where partisans do
the question wordings together and include an indicator variable for which wording the respondent received,
which allows the mean of the dependent variable to vary based on question wording.
46The GSS stopped asking this question after 1994, so observations after 1994 are set to the mean level in
1994.
47Coding it as a 1 for all years post 2001 instead of reverting back to a 0 does not change the results.
48An additional analysis was run including the square of the counter, which would allow for the effect of
time to curve. This variable was found to be estimated very close to zero for all models. It also did not
affect the substantive interpretation of the results; in the interest of parsimony, it was excluded.
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not disagree much (big cities, foreign aid, and crime), β3 should be near zero, indicating that
out-partisans and in-partisans react in much the same way to policy change (which could
include no reaction at all). I do not have strong expectations either way about whether
we should observe partisan feedback in education and the environment. These are medium
disagreement issues that are also of middling salience.
As the dependent variable is trichotomous with ordered outcomes (“too little,” “about
right,” “too much”), I use an ordered probit model to estimate Equation 6 separately for
each of the eight policy areas. I estimate the regressions in a Bayesian framework using
improper uniform priors on the unknown parameters.49 Substantive effects from ordered
probit models are difficult to see looking just at the coefficients, and with interaction terms
in the model, the task becomes much more difficult (Ai and Norton 2003). For these reasons,
I focus on interpreting predicted probabilities rather than the coefficients themselves. Point
estimates for the coefficients are reported in subsubsection A.2.2.
Figure 13 presents predicted probabilities from the model.50 In-partisans — those whose
party controls government — are represented by the solid blue-green line whereas out-
partisans are the dashed orange line. What can we learn from taking into account partisan
status?
With only a few exceptions, the trend of all of the predicted probabilities representing
people indicating they think we’re spending “too little” have a negative slope. In other
words, as spending on most policies increases, the probability of individuals indicating that
49Bayesian estimation makes the calculation of statistical uncertainty associated with the predicted prob-
ability straightforward (see Ai and Norton 2003, for a discussion of the difficulty of calculating the effects
of interaction terms in nonlinear models). The samplers were run for 10,000 iterations, the first 1,000 of
which were discarded as burn-in. Analyses to ensure that the samplers were well-behaved are available in
subsubsection A.2.4.
50The predicted probability of saying “too much” or “about right” is omitted from this figure for ease
of interpretation. Predicted probabilities for all three answer choices are included in Figure 21 in subsub-
section A.2.3. In order to obtain predicted probabilities from the model, we need to specify values for all
the variables included in the model. For the spending values (the horizontal axis), the smallest value is the
minimum spending level observed and the largest value is the maximum observed spending value in each
policy area. The other variables are set so that these predictions represent an individual who did not answer
the “alternative” question wording, and is a white female with a high school education from the East North




Welfare Defense Big Cities
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 1 2 3 4
10 20 30 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4 6 8






































Figure 13: Partisanship and policy feedback. Each panel presents predicted probabilities
from Equation 6. As the spending level on a policy increases, the predicted probability of
each answer option changes conditional on partisanship.
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they prefer more spending decreases, as the thermostatic model predicts. This is the case
whether we take partisanship into account or not for most issue areas. There are some areas,
however, where partisanship into account makes a great deal of difference.
Above, I argued that we should expect to see differences in thermostatic feedback across
partisan groups on high-salience issues with relatively large disagreement across partisan lines
(welfare, health, and defense). Specifically, the trend for the predicted probabilities should
be flatter for in-partisans than out-partisans among those issues. If this is the case, then
we can conclude that in-partisans behave less thermostatically than out-partisans. These
three issue ares do in fact display differences in thermostatic responsiveness. I also find
that partisans react differently to spending on the environment. In these four policy areas,
(defense, the environment, health, and welfare) in-partisans are less responsive to spending
than out-partisans — the trend of the predicted probabilities is flatter. This means that in-
partisans are less likely to change their stated relative preferences for more (or less) spending
as spending changes. In none of the eight policy areas do the results go in the opposite
direction of expectations.
These four areas also all exhibit large disagreement across partisan lines (see Table 4).
And, although spending on the environment has not historically been a highly divisive issue,
in recent years it has become much more divisive, which may account for the differences we
see in Figure 13.
There do not appear to be large differences in thermostatic behavior across partisan
lines on foreign aid, big cities, crime, and education. Spending on foreign aid and crime
exhibits very little disagreement by partisanship (again, see Table 4), and only moderate
disagreement across partisan lines exists on education. Estimates from the model predict
that there are not substantive differences in thermostatic feedback with regard to spending
on big cities, even though there exists relatively large disagreement across partisan lines in
this area (see Table 4). This is likely because big cities is not a salient issue area.
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Taken together, the weight of the evidence presented here suggests that partisanship
can and oftentimes does play an important role in the thermostatic process. It appears
to play the largest role on the most important issues — salient issues with relatively large
disagreements across partisan lines. Differences in thermostatic behavior are smaller among
issues where the two sides tend to agree, or if the issue area is not very salient.
3.5 Discussion
This paper began by considering a tension in the existing literature. Previous research shows
that the public reacts to policy changes (for examples, Wlezien 1995; Soroka and Wlezien
2010) and that public opinion among various subgroups changes roughly in parallel over time
(Page and Shapiro 1992). At the same time, research focusing on how partisans update and
maintain their preferences suggests that we should see differences across partisan groups (see
discussion in subsection 3.2). However, if partisans really do differ so drastically in how they
interpret information, why do we see such parallelism in their opinions over time?
Analysis reveals that there are differences in how people update their relative opinion for
more or less policy in response to policy changes based on partisanship on salient issues with
disagreement across partisan lines. Specifically, partisans of the same party as the president
are less responsive to policy changes in welfare, health, defense, and the environment than
out-partisans. Theoretically, reasons to expect these differences based on differences in
monitoring, accountability, and cue taking. There could, of course, be other mechanisms
driving the observed relationship. Pinning down the exact causal mechanisms is a task for
future research in this area.
These results suggest that there is an important role for partisanship in how people change
their opinions in response to policy changes. For some policies, it takes larger changes in
spending to produce changes in opinion among partisans whose party controls government.
On the other hand, partisans’ thermostatic behavior is stronger when the other party is in
control; a moderate change in spending can produce larger changes in opinion among out-
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partisans. These differences imply that we do not understand parallelisms in public opinion
as well as we had thought. Shifts in public opinion across policy areas are at least sometimes
conditional on partisan control of government. This has implications for the literature on
public opinion. It suggests that we need to consider partisan control of government as an
additional variable that can impact how partisans react to government policy.
Partisan feedback also matters for representation. Partisans apparently give their own
party more leeway to change policy and less leeway to the other party, at on salient issues
where they disagree with the other side. This suggests that parties may have a very hard
time convincing members of the opposite side of their policy successes, especially in policy
areas with large disagreements like defense and welfare. Now, in addition to attitudes such
as political trust (Claassen and Ensley 2016), we now know that partisanship can shape
opinion responses to policy change.
This can have very real consequences for public opinion and other political outcomes. As
others have already shown, higher levels of partisanship in the public decrease the effect of
short-term shifts in policy on electoral outcomes (Kayser and Wlezien 2011; Ezrow, Tavits,
and Homola 2014). The finding that partisans adjust their opinions differently in response
to policy change supports these findings, as it implies that partisanship may weaken these
policy-based democratic linkages. However, other policy areas such as spending on big cities





Whereas the previous two sections have been concerned with understanding political pref-
erences, this chapter looks at the other side of the equation. Instead of understanding
preferences, we now endeavor to understand political policy. What is the role of the public’s
preferences in public policy, and do some people’s preferences matter more than others?
Specifically, this section investigates whether Democrats or Republicans are more likely to
get their way.
In the runup to every modern election in the United States, people all over the country
experience a similar theme: “If you want your voice to count, vote!” This sentiment, drawn
on by organizations from college voter registration drives to well-funded and professionalized
operations like MoveOn, suggests that voting is one way that people can get their political
preferences translated into policy outputs.
Of course, researchers have investigated whether this is in fact the case. Do people’s
preferences actually get translated into policy outputs? Before looking at the evidence, there
is good reason to suspect they do not. After all, most people do not pay much attention
to politics outside the campaign, so politicians’ work can go unnoticed. Politicians have
motivation to respond to pressure other than just public opinion (for example, pressure from
their donors), so if the public is not paying much attention, perhaps public opinion does not
affect policy outputs much.
Several decades of research reveal that policy does in fact respond to public opinion, at
least with certain limitations (Wlezien 1995; Franklin and Wlezien 1997; Erikson, MacKuen,
and Stimson 2002; Burstein 2003). In fact, and consistent with the arguments of Get Out
the Vote campaigns described above, voting itself seems to ensure that people’s preferences
are better represented (Griffin and Newman 2005).
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However, getting everyone’s voice to affect policy equally is not the goal for many orga-
nizers on the ground. Registration drives and Get Out the Vote campaigns oftentimes have
explicit goals. These goals can be policy-based (in other words, dedicated to achieving a
particular policy outcome), or more generally partisan (in other words, hoping to elect more
members of a particular party). Their hope is to elect their own party’s politicians into office
so that their policy preferences can get translated into policy outputs.
In other words, partisans want to win elections to get their preferred policy outputs. This
basic assumption — that partisans’ opinions affect policy more when their party is in power
— underlies many theories of politics. People whose party wins the election are excited at
least in part because they believe that their opinion matters; they believe that policy will
move in their preferred direction. Losers are deflated because they feel as though they’ve
lost the ability to affect policy outputs.
However, whether partisans’ opinions matter more to policy outputs when their party
is in charge remains untested by researchers. Although we know that public opinion can
affect policy outputs, we do not know whether partisans’ opinions affect policy outputs more
when their party is in charge. There are of course strong reasons to believe it does, perhaps
the strongest of which is that it is a common assumption underlying discussion of American
politics in the news, in academic journals and conferences, and around the dinner table in
American homes. However, there are also reasons to suspect that this may not in fact be
the case. Public policy is, with rare exceptions, slow moving. It is therefore difficult to
see how partisans’ preferences could outweigh those of the other party given the frequent
shifts in party control. Additionally, until quite recently bipartisanship was commonplace,
and so we might expect that the preferences of partisans of both parties are reflected in
policy outputs. Even in the current era of heightened elite polarization, majority parties
are oftentimes forced to make compromises with the minority party because of various veto
points in the system, such as the filibuster in the Senate.
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In this section, I examine the widely-held yet little-tested theory that partisans’ opinions
affect policy outputs more when their party is in power. Using data from four issue areas
from 1976 to 2016, I show that in what might be considered to be the most important issue
areas — big-ticket areas with substantial disagreement across partisan lines — policy is more
responsive to partisans’ opinions if they are the same party as the president.
4.2 Theory
Does public opinion affect policy, and if so how? It is unsurprising that much ink has
been dedicated to studying this, given its centrality to modern theories of representative
democracy. Although we generally do not expect a perfect relationship between opinion and
policy, we do expect that policy generally responds to public preferences. Empirical research
shows that this seems to happen, at least under certain conditions (Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson 2002, for example). In other words, as demand for a policy goes up, supply of
that policy tends to go up as well. There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule.
In some policy areas, public opinion is simply unanchored to the policy status quo, and so
policy cannot respond to it (Wlezien 2016). At other times, pressure for change gradually
builds up and results in large changes all at once, a model known as “punctuated equilibrium
theory” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). However, we usually think of the normal day-to-day
effect of public opinion on public policy to be slow-moving. The thermostatic model is one
way of capturing this relationship (Wlezien 1995; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Pacheco 2013b).
In this model, policymakers adjust the supply of policy up or down in response to public
demand for that policy. As more of the public demands a certain policy, they are likely to get
more of it. On the other hand, if the public wants less of a certain policy, then policymakers
deliver less of it. There are of course caveats to this, and the strength of the relationship
varies across different contexts, but the general relationship often holds.
More recently, interest has turned toward gauging whether certain people’s preferences
matter more to policy outputs than others. A common concern is that the rich are able
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to influence policy more than average citizens, so it is perhaps unsurprising that this area
has received most of the attention of the newly-emerging field (see Bartels 2005; Soroka
and Wlezien 2008; Enns and Wlezien 2011; Gilens 2012; Flavin 2012; Gilens and Page 2014;
Enns 2015; Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien 2017, for examples). While there is some evidence
that the rich are slightly overrepresented, all of these analyses find that the preferences of
income groups are correlated at astonishingly high rates — sometimes with a Pearson’s r
approaching one (Soroka and Wlezien 2008). This limits the degree to which there can be
inequalities in representation across income groups. Given that income is not historically
the main dividing cleavage in American politics, this is perhaps unsurprising.
For empirical studies, differences in opinion across groups is important for at least two
reasons. First, without much difference, it is difficult to distinguish to whom policy is re-
sponding. From a methodological standpoint, if two groups’ opinions are perfectly correlated,
conventional statistics cannot distinguish between the two. Even if they are not perfectly
correlated, high correlations make it hard to distinguish estimated statistical effects from
one another.
Second, small differences across groups limit the practical importance of differential re-
sponsiveness. If policy responds to group A’s opinion more than group B, but group A
and group B have nearly identical opinions, then the opinion of group B will still be well
represented in policy outputs (Enns 2015).
Unlike income, partisanship is nicely aligned on the defining left-right cleavage in Amer-
ican politics. Although nearly all Americans agree on many items (such as low crime rates
being a good thing), on many issues there are substantial differences in opinion across parti-
san groups. This means that there is more room for meaningful gaps in policy representation
between partisan groups than across income groups.
The rest of this section is dedicated to figuring out which partisan group, if any, is
“winning.” In other words, is one partisan group doing better at getting their preferences
translated into policy outputs than the other? Are Democrats somehow more able to get
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their preferences translated into policy than Republicans? Or perhaps Independents are
running the show since their group presumably contains the median voter.
We can conceptualize policy P as a function of different groups’ opinions. This is rep-
resented in Equation 7, where D represents opinion of democrats, R represents opinions of
Republicans, and I represents other groups’ opinions (such as independents and minor-party
partisans).
P = f(R,D, I) (7)
The question, then, is how do we disentangle different groups’ effects?
While partisans have different opinions, we also know that party control of government is
hugely important for what kinds of policies the government enacts. We know, for example,
that Republican control of government is more likely to result in policy moving in a con-
servative direction, even though this costs them electorally (Wlezien 2017). We also know
that policymakers respond to their constituents (Butler and Nickerson 2011), and that they
may respond to constituents more often if they are of the same race (Butler and Broockman
2011).
Whether policymakers respond to their copartisans by shifting policy in their copartisan’s
preferred direction is as yet unanswered, but seems likely. In other words, whether partisans
opinions affect policy more when their party is in charge is not yet known.
There is reason to suspect that policymakers do respond more to their copartisans. It
seems likely that politicians want to keep their base happy. If that is the case, Democratic
politicians should be more likely to pass legislation that their Democratic supports favor,
and Republican politicians should be more likely to pass legislation that their supporters
favor. Of course, on the other hand the political inattentiveness of the average person is
well-documented, so politicians may suspect that once they get into office they can enact
policies they want, then try to persuade their base at election time that these policies will
actually be beneficial.
65
We already know that as demand for policy increases, supply of that policy also increases
(Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Therefore, we just need to modify what we know in order to
take into account subgroup opinion and partisan control of government. This suggests a
model where the effect of partisans’ opinions differs depending on the party in control of
government. Before turning to a specific modeling strategy, however, let us discuss the data.
4.3 Data
Spending data comes from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Historical Tables
“Table 5.1 — Budget Authority by Function and Subfunction.” Budget authority is typically
a better measure than actual spending outlays because we are interested in since it is more
closely related to policy representation (for a discussion of the differencecs, see Wlezien
and Soroka 2003). Budget authority does, however, have fewer observations than spending
outlays since the data only go back to 1976. Differencing the spending data means that
1977 is our first non-missing observation; leading the data means 1978 is the first year of our
analysis.
Since we already know the thermostatic model does not work in certain policy areas, or
only works very weakly, we focus here on the policy areas where we are most likely to be
able to detect effects (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 2016). Those areas are defense,
welfare, healthcare, and education. Note that these four policy areas are in many ways the
most important of the many issue areas the GSS asks about. Much more money is spent
in these areas, and they are oftentimes at or near the top of the national political debate.
Because we expect relative preferences to impact changes in spending rather than levels, I
difference the spending data. I also standardize the separate series to have mean zero and
standard deviation one to more easily allow comparisons across issue areas. Figure 14 shows






















































































Figure 14: Changes in spending. The vertical axis is standardized changes in spending. The
point for each year is a blue triangle, indicating a Democratic president, or a red circle,
indicating a Republican president.
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Note that these four areas are especially interesting because they are some of the areas
where partisans on average disagree the most.51 In other words, there are real disagree-
ments across partisan lines here, as opposed to superficial differences, like in the question
about whether we should spend more or less on combating crime. As discussed above, it is
important to have substantive disagreement if we are interested in competing preferences.
Data about public opinion comes from the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS collects
a sample of over 1,000 adults each time it runs, and it ran almost yearly from 1972 to 1994,
then biannually afterwards. The question on relative preferences reads, “We are faced with
many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going
to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think
we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.” The GSS
asks about many different policy areas, and also includes two different question wordings for
most of the areas. For example, the question about welfare asks half of respondents about
“welfare,” and the other half about “assistance to the poor.” Figure 15 shows net support
(the proportion of people preferring more spending minus the proportion of people preferring
less) by partisanship over time.52 Later in the analysis, I combine the two question wordings
to have a single opinion measure for each policy area. In these areas, the two question
wordings are highly correlated over time and combining them results in nearly identical
results than if we do not.
As noted by many others, aggregate opinion of partisan groups show remarkable paral-
lelism over time (Page and Shapiro 1992). The correlations between Democrat, Republican,
and independents’ preferences are shown in Table 5. However, there are times when one
party seems to move more than the other. One example that stands out is the drop in net
support for spending on health between 2008 and 2010, after the passage of the “Patient
51In the GSS data, partisans on average disagree most on welfare (alt), defense, welfare, city (alt), defense,
healthcare (alt), the environment (alt), healthcare, cities, energy, the environment, education (alt), social
security, space, education, space (alt), foreign aid (alt), crime, crime (alt), and then foreign aid, in that
order.
52I use net support to keep in line with previous research in this area. Using means instead of net support













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 15: Net support by partisanship across issues and years. Democrat net support is
represented by the blue line, Republican net support by the red line. Alternative question
wordings in dashed lines.
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Table 5: Opinion correlation between Democrats, Republicans, and Republicans across issues
Issue Dem Rep Dem Ind Rep Ind
Defense 0.71 0.88 0.83
Education 0.82 0.87 0.76
Welfare 0.72 0.85 0.62
Health 0.65 0.82 0.66
Protection and Affordable Care Act,” also known as “Obamacare.” Note that the drop is
much more pronounced for Republicans than Democrats, which suggests that partisans re-
spond more strongly to policy from the other party, an anecdote supported by findings by
section 3 (Branham 2018).
For the remainder of this section, we will ignore preferences of independents. There are
a few reasons for this. First, there just are not that many true independents. Research has
shown that people who identify as independent but “lean” to one party act as partisans
(Keith et al. 1992), so I include partisan leaners in their partisan group.53 Once that is
done, there aren’t that many “true” independents; only about 15 percent of the GSS sample
identifies as a “true” independent. It greatly complicates the analysis to include them,
because we then not only need to worry about estimating the effect of groups preferences, but
also some way to control for the size of the various groups. Finally, the equation we estimate
in order to compare partisans’ effects includes interactive effects. Including independents in
the model forces us to include their interactive effect as well, which given the limited data
just is not feasible to estimate reliably. Having said that, appendix subsubsection A.3.2
presents some analysis that parallel the main analyses and include independents.
4.4 Analysis
In order to capture the relationship between public policy, partisans’ opinions, and partisan
control of government, we need to decide on a modeling strategy. Equation 7 suggests a
53Including leaners as partisans or excluding them altogether does not affect the results much, though
including them does mean the analysis includes many more individuals.
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model with Democrat and Republican opinions, and the surrounding discussion suggests
that the effect of partisans’ opinions may depend (perhaps greatly) on the party in power.
Interaction terms are one way to model the effect of an independent variable on a dependent
variable when the effect itself depends on some third variable. This suggests an interactive
model, which is described in Equation 8.
∆Pjt+1 = βj0 + β1Rjt + β2Djt + β3Wjt + β4RjtWjt + β5DjtWjt + β6Cjt + jt (8)
∆P is the change in policy j at time t+ 1. Since we expect preference to have a lagged
effect on spending, we lead the dependent variable. In other words, preferences today impact
future policy. D and R are Democrat and Republican opinion, respectively. W is an indicator
variable for Democratic control of the White House. C is a variable representing the partisan
makeup of Congress, which allows us to assess the effects of partisans’ opinions after adjusting
for control of Congress. Specifically, it is measured as the proportion of Congress (House
and Senate) that is Republican.
Ideally we would be able to investigate the effect of partisan’s opinions under a divided
and unified government, rather than just looking at the presidency and controlling for the
number of Republican congresspeople. After all, if partisans’ opinions affect policy outputs
more when their party is in power, the logical expectation is that this is maximized if they
control the House, Senate, and Presidency. However, this is simply not possible. Divided
government is the norm in recent American politics; unified government is rare. Table 6
shows how low the number of observations would be. The number of observations is so low
for unified government that the model would be unestimable.
Table 6: Unified government is rare
Government Status GSS N N, Years
Unified, Democrat 5 7
Divided 18 28
Unified, Republican 2 4
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Table 7: Modeling the Conditional Effect of Partisans’ Opinions




Republican Net Support 0.014
(0.012)
Proportion Republican Congress 0.650
(1.441)
Dem * Dem Prez 0.028∗∗∗
(0.008)





Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Model includes fixed effects by issue area.
Note that Equation 8 is equivalent to a panel model where issues are what we would
usually conceptualize as individuals (in other words, instead of following multiple individuals
over time, we follow multiple issues over time). Thus, we also use fixed-effects by issue, which
allows the estimated intercepts to vary by issue.54 So we have four issues over 25 data points.
I estimate Equation 8 with the plm package in R.
54This makes the unrealistic assumption that the estimated slopes are identical across issues. We already
know that policy responsiveness varies by issue (see Soroka and Wlezien 2010, for example). However, making
this assumption gets us increased statistical power, which is essential for this model because preferences are
highly correlated over time. Additionally, detecting interaction effects is difficult, statistically speaking. It
usually requires several times the sample size (see Leon and Heo 2009, for example). And, although issues
do differ, we are only analyzing the four issue areas where the thermostatic model has already been shown
to work, so the slopes are similar (indeed, Soroka and Wlezien (2010) already combine a few issue areas
because of how similar they are). Results in Table 12 show what happens when this assumption is relaxed.
Results in most issue areas are statistically unreliable, which is unsurprising given the relatively low number
of observations and high number of parameters to estimate.
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Full results (omitting fixed effects) are presented in Table 7. Overall, the model is es-
timated with quite a bit of uncertainty. However, it does have some predictive power, and
the interaction does seem to improve the fit.55 Given how highly correlated partisans’ pref-
erences are (see Table 5), it is somewhat surprising that the model is able to differentiate
between the two groups at all. Table 7 suggests that the interaction effect is important,
though recall that assessing the effect requires more information than is available in that
table (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). From Table 7, we can see that under a Republican
president, neither group’s preferences are reliably different from zero. We can also see that
under a Democratic president, the effect of Democrats’ opinions increase and Republicans’
decrease, though it is not possible to see whether this is statistically significant.
Assessing effects in the presence of interactions requires calculating quantities of interest
and associated standard errors. Figure 16 presents that information. The estimated effect
of Democrat opinion is a solid blue dot with solid blue lines indicating confidence intervals.
The estimated effect of Republican opinion is a solid red dot with dashed red lines indicating
confidence intervals. The left pane is under a Democratic president; the right pane is under
a Republican president.
It appears that we can separate the effect of Democrat and Republican opinion under
a Democrat presidency. Under a Democrat presidency, Democrats’ opinions have a strong
effect on policy than Republicans’. Specifically, a one percentage point increase in Democrat’s
net support is estimated to result in about a 0.027 increase in (standardized) budget authority
the following year. Republicans’ opinions under a Democrat president are not found to
impact policy; in fact, the point estimate is slightly negative, though not reliably different
from zero.
On the other hand, the model is not able to distinguish between Democrat and Republican
opinion under a Republican president. Nor is it able to distinguish either one from zero
(though the model can say that the two together are greater than zero with quite a bit of





Democrat President Republican President
−0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 −0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04
Democrat Net Support
Republican Net Support
Estimated Effect of Group's Opinion
Figure 16: Estimated effects of Democrats’ and Republicans’ opinions under a Democratic
and Republican Presidents.
certainty — p < 0.01). The point estimates are, however, where we expect; Democratic
opinion is estimated to have a smaller effect than Republican opinion under a Republican
president. Even making the unrealistic assumption above that issues’ slopes are identical, it is
still somewhat surprising to get stable estimates out of the model with only 4 group variables,
100 data points, highly correlated independent variables, and two interaction terms.
One oddity that arises from the results in Table 7 and Figure 16 is the potentially
negative effects of out-partisans’ opinions on policy. Under a Democratic president, the
point estimate for Republican opinion is negative, and under a Republican president, the
point estimate for Democratic opinion is negative, though in both cases the result is not
significantly distinguishable from zero. Ignoring the uncertainty for a moment, why might
the effect of out-partisans’ opinion be negative? Why would out-partisans’ opinions have an
inverse effect on policy? A zero effect makes sense — in that case, out-partisans’ opinions
just do not affect policy. However, a negative effect is harder to explain at first glance. One
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answer comes as a corollary from the analysis in section 3. There, we see that out-partisans
react to policy too strongly; they shift their opinion more than they should when policy
changes. If their opinion then impacts future policy, presidents might balance against this
shift by moving policy against the change in opinion. In other words, presidents apparently
balance against this by shifting policy in the opposite direction of out-partisan opinion shifts.
4.5 Discussion
These analyses reveal that partisans are right to care deeply about election outcomes. In
the biggest issue areas with the most disagreement across partisan lines — in other words,
where it matters most — policy responds more (and sometimes solely) to in-partisans than
it does do out-partisans’ opinions. In other words, parties seem to represent partisans and
that’s pretty much it. Neither out-partisan opinion nor the opinion of independents seems
to have much or any real effect.
That said, the consequences are not as stark as one could imagine for a few reasons.
First, in-partisan opinion only weakly predicts policy change. Second, even where it does
determine policy, policy winds up about where it would anyway, given that preferences are
heavily correlated across in-partisans, out-partisans, and independents (see Table 5, as well as
a lengthier discussion of this, albeit focused on income groups in Enns (2015) and Branham,
Soroka, and Wlezien (2017)).
As polarization at the elite level reaches historical levels, it seems even more important
for partisans to win elections in order to get their preferences reflected in policy outputs.
Although this paper did not consider whether the relationship changed over time, it seems
likely that the effect of partisan opinion on policy outputs is stronger now than it was when
the two parties were largely the same.
It is also important to note that this comes with a caveat. The results come with quite a
bit of statistical uncertainty, especially under a Republican presidency. This could be due to
the limited amount of data, or it could be indicative that policy under Republican presidents
75
responds more equally to partisan groups’ opinions than under a Democratic president. This
is not unreasonable; after all, self-described Democrats outnumber self-described Republicans
in the electorate, especially in the earlier years of the analysis. Perhaps Republican presidents
were more responsive to Democrats than Democrat presidents were to Republicans since
there is more of an electoral advantage for Republican presidents to court Democratic voters.
More research in this area is needed to come to a definite conclusion.
What are other implications of these findings? When considered together with recent
research showing that in-partisans are less responsive to policy change (Branham 2018), this
may help explain why parties often run to the extremes. For example, Wlezien (2017) finds
that the longer a president’s tenure, the less representative they become. This could be
at least partially due to the combination of presidents catering to their partisan’s opinions
but partisans not updating those opinions. In other words, Republican presidents may push
policy rightwards, but Republican voters don’t respond as if they had. Republican presidents
then perhaps continue to respond to now-outdated Republican opinion and get punished for
pushing policy too far in one direction. There is still more research needed in this area




A.1 Appendix for Modeling Spending Preferences & Public Policy
A.1.1 2014 GSS Question Wording Analysis
In addition to the questions listed in Table 1, half of the respondents in the 2014 GSS
were randomized to receive alternate question wordings for eleven of these items. This
survey experiment provides a unique opportunity to examine the dependence of our model’s
estimates on the specific wording of questions used to estimate the model.
Table 8 lists these alternate question wordings. Some of these changes (e.g. “space
exploration” versus “space exploration program”) seem likely to be inconsequential. Others,
however, such as “welfare” versus “assistance to the poor” seem more likely to produce
estimates that meaningfully differ between the two wordings.
Table 8: Alternative question wordings
Response Percent
Policy Variable Wording too much about right too little
Foreign Aid nataidy assistance to other countries 74.1 20.4 5.5
Defense natarmsy national defense 31.5 36.1 32.4
Big cities natcityy assistance to big cities 38.4 41.7 19.9
Crime natcrimy law enforcement 13.7 39.2 47.1
Drugs natdrugy drug rehabilitation 13.9 33.8 52.3
Education nateducy education 7.5 17.7 74.8
Environment natenviy the environment 12.2 26.9 60.9
Welfare natfarey assistance to the poor 11.8 24.4 63.8
Health nathealy health 20.7 22.2 57.1
Race natracey assistance to Blacks 24.1 46.9 29.0
Space natspacy space exploration 32.6 42.5 24.9
In order to understand the effects of these different question wordings, we estimate our
model treating each question wording as a different item. This produces discrimination
parameter and cutpoint estimates for twenty-nine items (the standard wordings for the same
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Figure 17: Discrimination Parameter Estimates, 2014 GSS with Alternate Wordings
A key question will be how these item’s parameters, in particular βj and pj differ across the
two phrasings.
Figure 17 is comparable to Figure 1 and shows the estimated discrimination parameters.
Estimates for the standard wordings, plotted in black, are quite similar to those in Figure 1.
Furthermore, the discrimination parameter estimates for the alternate wordings are similar
for eight out of the eleven items. The three items for which 95% HPDs differ between the
two versions are cities, welfare, and crime.
Figure 18 is comparable to Figure 2 in that it plots the estimated cutpoints for each
policy. The estimated cutpoints do not overlap for six policies: welfare, race, health (κ1
only), drugs (κ2 only), big cities, and foreign aid (κ1 only).
Figure 19 plots the estimated policy positions for standard and alternate wordings for
items in the 2014 GSS. The policy with the strongest evidence of divergence between the two
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Figure 18: Estimated cutpoints, 2014 GSS with Alternate Wordings
for “welfare” and for “aid to the poor” are often cited as classic examples of question wording
effects. Figure 19 shows that the estimated position of spending on “aid to the poor” is well
to the left of that for “welfare,” with the former estimated to the left of zero and the later
to the right. The policy positions for the two wordings of the race item also showed clear,
albeit relatively small, differences. Even though the wordings on this issue — “improving
the condition of Blacks” versus “assistance to Blacks” — do not seem dramatically different.
Finally, spending on cities, for which the standard and alternate wordings, respectively, are
“solving the problems of big cities” and “assistance to big cities,” show fairly large differences.
Overall, the model’s estimates appear fairly robust to changes in wording, but with
some important exceptions. This might be thought to imply that the spending preferences

































Figure 19: Ideal Point and Policy Position Estimates, 2014 GSS with Alternate Wordings
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A.1.2 Convergence and Diagnostics
This section reports convergence and diagnostic tests for the 2014 GSS sampler without
alternative questions (the results presented in subsection 2.2) and for the run with the 1998
GSS and NPAT data jointly scaled (results in subsection 2.3).
Because of the large number of parameters estimated (for example, 18 βs, 36 κs, and
2, 538 ideal points for the 2014 GSS data), it is virtually impossible to visually inspect
the traceplots for each parameter to asses convergence. We did manually inspect many
traceplots, none of which indicated a problem with convergence.
We also inspected the diagnostic suggested by Geweke (1991). Again, the large number
of parameters prevents us from manually inspecting each parameter. A density plot of the z
statistics shows that they look very similar to a standard normal distribution, which is what
we would expect if the sampler had converged to its stationary distribution. Furthermore,
we reject roughly five percent of the Geweke tests across all parameters—what we should
expect if the null hypothesis of convergence is actually true. Similarly, the convergence test
statistic proposed by Heidelberger and P. Welch (1983) also suggests convergence. All but 13
of the 2,592 parameters estimated in the 2014 analysis pass this convergence test. Given the
large number of parameters, this tiny fraction of rejections (around one half of one percent
of parameters) does not seem problematic. The results for the Heidelberger and Welch test
for the 1998 analyses is similar, with only 25 out of 3,360 parameters failing the convergence
test (less than one percent of parameters).
Finally, we also ran five separate chains of the sampler for both the 2014 and 1998
datasets starting from over-dispersed initial values and calculated the convergence diagnostic
proposed by Gelman and Rubin (1992). For both datasets, the test statistic was well below
the conventionally used cutoff of 1.1 (the largest value across all parameters and both datasets
was 1.03) after a short number of iterations, implying that our burn-in period of 100,000
iterations was more than enough.
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Effective sample sizes are large for all parameters in both model runs. In the 2014 run
containing the GSS data, the minimum effective sample size we find is 6, 054. Similarly,
the 1998 run with both the GSS and NPAT data yields a minimum effective sample size of
3, 662.
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A.2 Appendix for Partisan Feedback
A.2.1 Thermostatic Feedback at the Individual Level
As described in the main text, salient issues are more likely to display thermostatic feedback
than nonsalient issues (Soroka and Wlezien 2010). First, we estimate Equation 5, where the
estimated sign of β1 tells us about policy feedback. If negative, then the thermostatic model
works as expected.
I estimate the model in a Bayesian context separately for each policy area.56 Because the
meaning of coefficients from an ordered probit analysis can be difficult to interpret, I report
predicted probabilities. It is important to note, however, that the mean of the posterior
estimate for the coefficient associated with spending is negative in all cases, suggesting that
the logic of the thermostatic model works quite well at the individual level.
Let us now turn to the analysis. Figure 20 plots the predicted probability of saying “too
little” for each of the policy areas.57 Values for the other variables as well as the scale of the
axes are the same as presented in Figure 20, see footnote 50. The horizontal axis is levels of
spending on a policy in tens of billions of 2000 dollars and the predicted probability is along
the vertical axis. The lines represent posterior means and the shaded areas represent 95
percent highest posterior densities. The horizontal axis ranges from the minimum observed
value in each spending domain to the maximum observed value.
These predicted probabilities highlight the lopsided nature of respondents’ answers to
some of the questions. The levels of some predicted probabilities are always quite high or
quite low. For example, the predicted probability of saying “too little” when asked about
spending on several issues — crime, education, the environment, and health — is always
quite high. Conversely, the predicted probability of saying “too little” is being spent on
foreign aid is always quite low. This is a feature of the data; it is simply the case that
most people say that they prefer more or less spending on certain policies. So although the
56Sampler diagnostics are reported in subsubsection A.2.4.
57As before, predicted probabilities for “too much” and “about right” are omitted for ease of interpretation,
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Figure 20: Policy feedback at the individual level. As the spending level on a policy increases,
the predicted probability of preferring more spending decreases. Each panel presents pre-
dicted probabilities from Equation 5.
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predicted probabilities in Figure 20 for saying “too little” is being spent on welfare are always
quite low, they would be much higher if instead we presented the predicted probability of
saying “too little” is being spent on “assistance to the poor,” the alternative wording for
that question.
In every issue area, the trend of the predicted probabilities for saying “too little” is
negative. This indicates that the predicted probability on every issue for saying “too little”
decreases as spending increases, which is what the thermostatic model predicts.
That said, patterns clearly differ depending on the issue. For some issues, the trend of the
predicted probabilities is much steeper than others. Foreign aid, for example, shows almost
no thermostatic feedback. On the other hand, higher-profile issues like welfare and defense
exhibit relatively large differences depending on the spending level. These differences are
important, suggesting that people are more responsive to spending changes in some domains
than others. In particular, people are basically unresponsive to spending changes in foreign
aid, and only modestly responsive to spending changes in education, two low salience issues.
There is relatively strong thermostatic feedback in the remaining domains: big cities, crime,
defense, the environment, health, and welfare. The thermostatic model works well at the
individual level across a wide range of issues. As spending goes up, the predicted probability
of saying “too little” goes down and the predicted probability of saying “too much” goes up.
A.2.2 Parameter Estimates
Interpretation of regression output for ordered probit models is notoriously difficult. Pre-
dicted probabilities are reported in the main text. I report here the posterior means and
standard deviations of the regression coefficients. Table 9 reports the results from estimating
Equation 5 and Table 10 reports the results from estimating Equation 6.
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Table 9: Regression output summary for models estimated from Equation 2
Parameter Statistic City Crime Defense Education Environment Foreign Aid Health Welfare
Spending Mean -0.305 -0.106 -0.014 -0.034 -0.281 -0.026 -0.032 -0.032
(SD) (0.02) (0.014) (0.001) (0.006) (0.021) (0.015) (0.003) (0.004)
Russia Mean 0.046
SD 0.004
Intercept Mean 1.527 1.549 0.415 0.991 1.871 -0.614 1.268 0.171
(SD) (0.044) (0.033) (0.047) (0.037) (0.057) (0.041) (0.033) (0.033)
Alt wording Mean -0.756 -0.225 -0.028 0.13 0.056 -0.143 -0.076 1.209
(SD) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Counter Mean -0.007 0.003 0.017 0.015 0.003 0.009 0.023 0.021
(SD) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
HS Educaiton Mean 0.067 0.111 -0.1 0.258 0.254 -0.136 0.084 -0.202
(SD) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Over HS Edu Mean 0.175 -0.01 -0.365 0.362 0.372 0.128 0.008 -0.193
(SD) (0.018) (0.018) (0.02) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Female Mean 0.139 0.18 0.005 0.136 0.078 0.058 0.176 0.076
(SD) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Cutpoint Mean 1.077 1.208 1.2 1.096 1.071 1.022 1.006 0.917
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Table 9: (continued)
Parameter Statistic City Crime Defense Education Environment Foreign Aid Health Welfare
(SD) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
post911 Mean 0.139
SD 0.016
Black Mean 0.509 0.15 -0.295 0.437 0.219 0.198 0.428 0.749
(SD) (0.018) (0.019) (0.02) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.02) (0.018)
Hispanic Mean 0.204 -0.055 -0.361 0.037 0.119 0.4 -0.021 0.271
(SD) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.03) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Middle Atlantic Mean -0.045 0.045 0.028 0.012 -0.064 -0.095 0.039 -0.12
(SD) (0.03) (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
E. Nor. Central Mean -0.154 0.08 0.102 -0.037 -0.18 -0.142 -0.12 -0.141
(SD) (0.03) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.03)
W. Nor. Central Mean -0.22 0.017 0.087 -0.031 -0.207 -0.117 -0.169 -0.15
(SD) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.035)
South Atlantic Mean -0.314 0.131 0.28 0.048 -0.199 -0.078 -0.101 -0.184
(SD) (0.03) (0.03) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
E. Sou. Central Mean -0.417 0.179 0.321 0.08 -0.306 -0.143 -0.126 -0.198
(SD) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036)
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Table 9: (continued)
Parameter Statistic City Crime Defense Education Environment Foreign Aid Health Welfare
W. Sou. Central Mean -0.318 0.132 0.307 -0.008 -0.267 -0.112 -0.187 -0.195
(SD) (0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033)
Mountain Mean -0.265 -0.064 0.118 0.039 -0.28 -0.112 -0.17 -0.104
(SD) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035)
Pacific Mean -0.119 0.034 -0.013 0.041 -0.199 -0.036 -0.078 -0.114
(SD) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031)
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Table 10: Regression output summary for interactive models
Parameter Statistic City Crime Defense Education Environment Foreign Aid Health Welfare
Spending Mean -0.339 -0.108 -0.019 -0.029 -0.466 -0.050 -0.043 -0.051
(SD) ( 0.026) ( 0.015) ( 0.001) ( 0.007) ( 0.027) ( 0.021) ( 0.003) ( 0.004)
In partisan Mean -0.108 -0.024 -0.252 0.025 -0.911 -0.018 -0.249 -0.481
(SD) ( 0.034) ( 0.026) ( 0.061) ( 0.040) ( 0.089) ( 0.052) ( 0.023) ( 0.029)
Interaction Mean 0.066 0.002 0.008 -0.012 0.363 0.048 0.018 0.028
(SD) ( 0.031) ( 0.010) ( 0.002) ( 0.008) ( 0.035) ( 0.029) ( 0.002) ( 0.002)
Russia Mean 0.046
SD 0.004
Intercept Mean 1.579 1.556 0.548 0.978 2.322 -0.598 1.373 0.392
(SD) ( 0.048) ( 0.034) ( 0.057) ( 0.042) ( 0.070) ( 0.049) ( 0.035) ( 0.035)
Alt wording Mean -0.756 -0.226 -0.026 0.130 0.058 -0.143 -0.077 1.214
(SD) ( 0.013) ( 0.013) ( 0.013) ( 0.013) ( 0.013) ( 0.013) ( 0.014) ( 0.013)
Counter Mean -0.007 0.003 0.017 0.015 0.003 0.008 0.025 0.023
(SD) ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.002) ( 0.002)
HS Educaiton Mean 0.068 0.112 -0.100 0.258 0.261 -0.138 0.093 -0.189
(SD) ( 0.016) ( 0.016) ( 0.018) ( 0.016) ( 0.016) ( 0.017) ( 0.016) ( 0.016)
Over HS Edu Mean 0.176 -0.009 -0.367 0.362 0.381 0.125 0.017 -0.180
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Table 10: (continued)
Parameter Statistic City Crime Defense Education Environment Foreign Aid Health Welfare
(SD) ( 0.018) ( 0.018) ( 0.020) ( 0.019) ( 0.018) ( 0.019) ( 0.018) ( 0.018)
Female Mean 0.139 0.181 0.005 0.135 0.075 0.057 0.175 0.074
(SD) ( 0.012) ( 0.012) ( 0.013) ( 0.012) ( 0.012) ( 0.013) ( 0.012) ( 0.012)
Cutpoint Mean 1.078 1.208 1.202 1.096 1.072 1.023 1.010 0.922
(SD) ( 0.008) ( 0.009) ( 0.009) ( 0.009) ( 0.008) ( 0.010) ( 0.009) ( 0.007)
post911 Mean 0.149
SD 0.016
Black Mean 0.508 0.148 -0.293 0.436 0.206 0.201 0.410 0.724
(SD) ( 0.018) ( 0.018) ( 0.019) ( 0.020) ( 0.018) ( 0.019) ( 0.020) ( 0.018)
Hispanic Mean 0.201 -0.056 -0.358 0.034 0.114 0.402 -0.030 0.263
(SD) ( 0.030) ( 0.029) ( 0.030) ( 0.032) ( 0.031) ( 0.030) ( 0.030) ( 0.029)
Middle Atlantic Mean -0.044 0.047 0.029 0.013 -0.060 -0.093 0.046 -0.115
(SD) ( 0.031) ( 0.031) ( 0.034) ( 0.033) ( 0.032) ( 0.033) ( 0.033) ( 0.031)
E. Nor. Central Mean -0.154 0.081 0.101 -0.036 -0.177 -0.141 -0.112 -0.135
(SD) ( 0.030) ( 0.031) ( 0.033) ( 0.031) ( 0.031) ( 0.032) ( 0.032) ( 0.030)
W. Nor. Central Mean -0.220 0.017 0.087 -0.029 -0.203 -0.115 -0.159 -0.143
(SD) ( 0.034) ( 0.035) ( 0.037) ( 0.036) ( 0.035) ( 0.037) ( 0.036) ( 0.033)
91
Table 10: (continued)
Parameter Statistic City Crime Defense Education Environment Foreign Aid Health Welfare
South Atlantic Mean -0.315 0.133 0.282 0.048 -0.195 -0.076 -0.091 -0.176
(SD) ( 0.030) ( 0.031) ( 0.033) ( 0.031) ( 0.032) ( 0.031) ( 0.031) ( 0.029)
E. Sou. Central Mean -0.417 0.179 0.320 0.081 -0.306 -0.142 -0.122 -0.194
(SD) ( 0.036) ( 0.037) ( 0.040) ( 0.038) ( 0.036) ( 0.037) ( 0.037) ( 0.035)
W. Sou. Central Mean -0.317 0.133 0.308 -0.009 -0.266 -0.110 -0.182 -0.193
(SD) ( 0.033) ( 0.034) ( 0.036) ( 0.035) ( 0.035) ( 0.035) ( 0.034) ( 0.033)
Mountain Mean -0.265 -0.063 0.118 0.041 -0.277 -0.113 -0.161 -0.097
SD 0.036 0.035 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.035
Pacific Mean -0.119 0.036 -0.015 0.041 -0.200 -0.036 -0.074 -0.111
SD 0.032 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.031
A.2.3 Figure of All Predicted Probabilities
In the interest of space and for ease of comparison, Figure 13 in the main text presents the
predicted probabilities of saying “too little.” The model, however, also makes predictions
for saying “too much” and “about right,” which I report here. Figure 21 reports the same
predicted probabilities as Figure 20 including all three response options, and Figure 22 does
the same for Figure 13.
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Figure 21: Predicted probabilities for all three answer options
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Figure 22: Predicted probabilities for all three answer options
A.2.4 Convergence and Autocorrelation Checks
Inspections of output indicate that the samplers converged fairly quickly. I visually inspected
some of the plots to see if there were any obvious indications of nonconvergence; there
were none. I also ran geweke diagnostics on the output of the posterior simulation; for
the noninteractive models estimated from Equation 5, only 9.88 percent of the parameters
exhibited a z score of greater than 1.96 or less than −1.96. For the interactive models from
Equation 6, 7.87 percent exhibited extreme z values; in expectation, five percent should.
I also visually inspected some of the autocorrelation function plots, which indicated some
autocorrelation, which is to be expected. To allay fears of especially high autocorrelation, I
used the effectiveSize function from the coda R package to calculate effective sample size.
The mean effective sample size for the noninteractive models from Equation 5 is 1,941.93
and the minimum value is 536.77 . For the interactive models estimated from Equation 6,
the mean effective sample size is 1,916.37 and the minimum is 559.14 .
A.2.5 Partisan News Consumption
In the section “Explanation 1: Changes in Policy,” I suggest that a logical extension of the
work showing that in-partisans trust government more than out-partisans is that in-partisans
are less likely to monitor government closely. This section examines the plausibility of that
statement.
In a 2014 study titled, “Local News in a Digital Age,” the Pew Research Center surveyed
approximately 1,000 residents each of Denver, Colorado; Macon, Georgia; and Sioux City,
Iowa on their news consumption. To see whether in-partisans consume less news than out-
partisans, I rely on two questions from this study. The first asks respondents, “How closely
do you follow national news?” and the second asks, “How closely do you follow news about
the [Denver/Macon/Sioux City] area?” Response options are on a four point scale ranging
from “very closely” to “not at all closely.”
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It is beneficial to have not only the national news questions but also the local news ques-
tions because it permits testing the plausibility of this mechanism at both the national and
state level. I code partisans as being “national in-partisans” if they are Democrats (Presi-
dent Obama held office in 2014) and partisans are coded as “state in-partisans” according to
whether they matched the party of the governor of their state (Democratic in Colorado, and
Republican in Georgia and Iowa). I then ran an OLS regression model predicting news in-
terest at the national level with whether or not individuals were “national in-partisans” and
news interest at the local level with whether or not individuals were “state in-partisans.”58
The expectation is that the coefficient associated with in-partisans is negative.59
Results are reported in Table 11. Each column represents a separate regression, two
for the national level (one with fixed effects for the city), and two for the local level (one
with city fixed effects). In-partisans report following the news less closely than out-partisans
at both the national and state level. This suggests that partisans do in fact monitor the
government more closely when they are out-partisans than when they are in-partisans.
58I also ran simple differences in means as well as ordered probit models with no difference in the substantive
results reported here.
59I recoded the variable so that higher values indicate following the news more closely.
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Table 11: In partisans follow news less closely than out partisans
Dependent variable:
national news local news
(1) (2) (3) (4)






In partisan, state −0.059∗∗ −0.053∗∗
(0.025) (0.025)
Constant −1.650∗∗∗ −1.633∗∗∗ −1.560∗∗∗ −1.610∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.027) (0.018) (0.028)
Observations 3,122 3,122 3,177 3,177
R2 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.003
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
97
A.3 Appendix for Partisan Policymaking
A.3.1 Robustness Checks
Results which do not pool the issues together are fairly brittle; there are only 25 observations
and the regressions are likely too underpowered to reliably detect interaction effects. With
only 18 degrees of freedom we might also fret about the asymptotic assumptions underlying
the model. Nevertheless, results are presented in Table 12.
We also might be interested in whether the interaction terms are worth adding to the
model. Perhaps politicians respond to all people, regardless of political view? Results above
already suggest this is unlikely, and Table 13 provides further evidence of this. Clearly,
results in the main text (Table 7) fit the data better than results without the interaction
term.
A.3.2 Considering Independents
The main analysis of section 4 is an attempt to determine whether the preferences of one par-
tisan group prevail over the preferences of another partisan group. For that reason and others
(discussed near the end of subsection 4.3), independents and non-major-party partisans are
excluded from the main analysis. In this section, we consider a related, though different
question. Perhaps instead of representing one partisan group or the other, politicians must
decide whether to represent their own partisans or independents.
In this section, we attempt to include independents in the analysis. We do so in two ways.
First, we include independents and out-partisans together. This has the advantage that the
two groups whose preferences we are pitting against each other remain more-or-less the same
size as each other. To do this, taking Equation 8, we can conceptualize D as “in-partisan
opinion” and R as “everyone else” (or vice versa). This tests a slightly different, though
related, theory, that in-partisan opinion affects policy more than everyone else’s opinion (in
other words, not just more than the other party, but more than the other party and also
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Table 12: Estimation by issue area
spending
Defense Education Welfare Health
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat Net Support −0.051∗ 0.019 0.055 −0.021
(0.025) (0.054) (0.048) (0.072)
Democrat President 1.037 0.784 1.421 1.351
(0.787) (4.746) (2.902) (5.605)
Republican Net Support 0.054∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.012 0.026
(0.016) (0.040) (0.052) (0.060)
Proportion Republican Congress −3.783 1.669 2.007 2.500
(2.659) (3.697) (3.337) (3.467)
Dem * Dem Prez 0.061∗∗ −0.033 −0.018 0.002
(0.026) (0.121) (0.055) (0.109)
Rep * Dem Prez −0.076∗∗∗ 0.040 0.012 −0.017
(0.021) (0.121) (0.068) (0.069)
Constant 0.743 −2.092 −1.520 −1.346
(1.139) (4.052) (2.857) (3.446)
Observations 25 25 25 25
R2 0.643 0.076 0.270 0.092
Adjusted R2 0.524 −0.231 0.026 −0.211
Residual Std. Error (df = 18) 0.649 1.119 1.014 1.075
F Statistic (df = 6; 18) 5.400∗∗∗ 0.248 1.107 0.302
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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F Statistic 0.655 (df = 4; 92)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Model includes fixed effects by issue area.
independents and minor party partisans). See Table 14 in for these results. The results do
not change much, though the confidence intervals do overlap a bit more since these
However, pitting in-partisans’ opinions against everyone else’s opinions may not be a
satisfactory test. If politicians are weighing whether to respond to their copartisans’ opin-
ions or independents (who presumably contain the median voter), perhaps we should let
independent opinion compete directly against in-partisan opinion in the model. So instead
of combining out-partisan opinion and independent opinion, we can simply let in-partisan
opinion compete directly with independents’ opinions.
Table 15 presents results where we model the effect of in-partisan opinion and inde-
pendent opinion. Table 15 should be interpreted similar to Table 7. Figure 23 presents
estimated quantities of interest and confidence intervals, akin to Figure 16. Results suggest
that in-partisan opinion is more important than independents’ opinions. Under a Republican
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Proportion Republican Congress 0.673
(1.447)
Not in-partisans * Dem Prez −0.016
(0.025)





Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Model includes fixed effects by issue area.
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Proportion Republican Congress 0.679
(1.469)
In partisan, Dem Prez −0.015
(0.028)





Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01





Democrat President Republican President
−0.04 −0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06−0.04 −0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06
In−partisan Net Support
Independent Net Support
Estimated Effect of Group's Opinion
Figure 23: Estimated effects of In-partisan and Independent opinions under a Democratic
and Republican Presidents.
president, in-partisan opinion is estimated to be quite a bit more important than independent
opinion, though the confidence intervals do overlap some.
Under a Democratic president, it is more difficult to be sure; the point estimates for
the effect of in-partisan net support and independent net support on policy change are very
similar. This may be due to the fact that we have fewer observations under a Democratic
president and also that Democrats’ opinions are more correlated with independents’ opinions
than Republicans’ opinions are (see Table 5).
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